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Abstract 
BAN Logic is a well-known formalism for the analysis of protocols used 
for authentication in distributed systems. This formalism deals with the evo-
lution of beliefs of trustworthy principals executing an authentication pro-
tocol. The evolution of beliefs as a consequence of communication between 
the principals is modeled by the inference rules of the logic. The logic has 
been successful in formally discovering flaws and redundancies in a num-
ber of widely used protocols. A probabilistic extension of the logic allows 
calculation of a measure of trust in the goal of a protocol. 
This thesis proposes a Prolog program to automate BAN logic analysis 
of authentication protocols. The program provides a protocol-independent 
inference engine, which takes as input the specification of a protocol, and 
generates all the logical statements describing the state of the principals ex-
ecuting the protocol. A proof explanation faciUty in the program provides a 
stepwise description of all minimal proofs of the logical statements attained 
during a protocol run. The program enables automatic identification of re-
dundant assumptions and also facilitates probabilistic analysis of protocols. 
It has been used to perform machine-aided BAN logic analysis of several 
well-known protocols. 
Publications arising out of this thesis 
1. A. Mathuria, R. Safavi-Naini, and P. Nickolas, "Exploring Minimal 
BAN Logic Proofs of Authentication Protocols," in Proceedings of the 
Tenth International Conference on Information Security (IFIP SEC'94)^ 
•May 1994. 
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Chapter 1 
Authentication Protocols 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the identity authentication problem 
in distributed computer systems. The use of encryption for authentication 
is illustrated by means of the well-known Needham-Schroeder shared-key 
protocol [16]. Finally, the need for protocol verification is motivated by a 
discussion of the flaw in this protocol. 
1.1 Introduction 
A distributed computing system consists of various principals which com-
municate over a network. In such a system, the same communication lines 
are used by the principals to communicate with each other. This allows 
each principal to eavesdrop on the messages transmitted over the network. 
Each principal can also initiate communications and block, insert and alter 
messages which are sent over the network. Moreover, such mischief can be 
carried out by a legitimate user of the system itself. It is therefore obvi-
ous that the principals intending to communicate with each other in such a 
hostile environment would be suspicious about each other's identities. 
Identity authentication refers to the process of mutual verification of iden-
tities by the principals wishing to engage in a secure communication. It in-
volves checking of identities claimed by various principals and often precedes 
subsequent communications protected by shared/public keys. In a shared-key 
system, principals typically verify each other's identities by an authenticated 
exchange of session keys. Such an exchange involves establishment of a new 
shared secret key or verifying a previously established shared key for fur-
ther use. Verification of identities amongst principals in a public-key system 
typically involves acquiring each other's public keys. 
An authentication protocol is an algorithm specifying a procedure for at-
taining authentication. It consists of a sequence of messages to be exchanged 
and the rules governing their exchange between the parties involved. The 
most common way of achieving an authenticated exchange of session/public-
keys to attain authentication is by using a trusted principal known as the 
authentication server. Each principal of a shared-key system is assumed to 
share a secret key with the server. In a public-key system, it is assumed 
that each principal has registered his public key with the server whose public 
key is well-known. A typical authentication protocol makes use of nonces or 
timestamps to prevent replays of old messages from being accepted as recent. 
Nonces are fresh quantities in the sense that they have never been used for 
this purpose in the past. 
A protocol can fail to achieve its goal due to a weakness in the message 
structure or the rules comprising the protocol rather than that of the under-
lying cryptosystem used. This is clearly demonstrated by the existence of 
flaws in a large number of published protocols [1]. The Needham-Schroeder 
shared-key protocol discussed in the next section is an instructive example 
of a flawed protocol. 
1.2 The Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key Pr-
otocol 
The aim of this protocol [16] is to securely distribute a session key Kab to 
principals A and B. These principals are assumed to share secret keys Kas 
and Kbs with the server S respectively. The notation A B : M denotes 
the communication of message M from A to B. A message M encrypted 
with the key K is denoted as { M } K ' The concatenation of messages M and 
M' is denoted by M,M'. The protocol is illustrated in Figure 1.1. 
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Figure 1.1: The Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol. 
1 . 2 . 1 M e s s a g e s 
In the beginning of the protocol, the initiator, principal A, generates a nonce 
Na and includes it in his request to the authentication server S for a secure 
channel to communicate with principal B by sending the following message: 
(1.1) 
In response to (1.1), S sends to A a message conveying the session key Kab 
and an authenticator for B: 
S-^ A: {Na,BJUAKab,A}KjKa. (1.2) 
Principal A decrypts (1.2) and checks for the presence of the nonce Na and the 
identity of the intended recipient, principal B. The session key Kab generated 
by S is such that it has never been used in the past. The freshness of the 
nonce Na ensures that an intruder is not able to force reuse of a previously 
used session key by replaying a previously recorded message from S to A. 
Also, the identifier for B prevents an attacker X from impersonating B by 
altering B to X in (1.1). After verifying his nonce and the identity of the 
intended recipient, A forwards the authenticator {Kab, A}Kbs ̂ ^ 
(1.3) 
Principal B decrypts (1.3) to obtain the session key and the identity of 
the intending correspondent, principal A. He then generates a nonce Nh and 
requests a handshake with A to ensure that A is in possession of the session 
key Kab : 
B ^ A : (1.4) 
Finally, A is expected to reply to B by returning f{Nb) = 1 encrypted 
with the session key: 
(1.5) 
The last message (1.5) ends the protocol, and its execution is intended to 
leave principals A and B in possession of the session key Kab-
1.2.2 The Flaw 
This protocol has a serious flaw. The outline of the attack is as follows. An 
intruder X prevents message (1.3) from reaching B by blocking it and then 
emits an old authenticator containing a compromised session key CK: 
X - ^ B : { C K , A } k , , (1.6) 
Message (1.6) is the old authenticator recorded by X during an earlier 
run of the protocol between A and B. The rest of the protocol proceeds as 
before with X masquerading as A. Thus B would unknowingly communicate 
with X instead of A. 
1.2.3 Fixing The Flaw 
Denning and Sacco [15] first pointed out the flaw in the Needham-Schroeder 
shared-key protocol by outlining the attack given above. They proposed a 
solution to repair the flaw in the original protocol by using timestamps. Sub-
sequently, Needham and Schroeder [12] amended their protocol to eliminate 
the flaw without using timestamps. These two different solutions to fix the 
same flaw are described below. 
Using Timestamps 
In the Denning-Sacco protocol, the principals A and B do not generate 
nonces, unlike the original Needham-Schroeder protocol described in Sec-
tion 1.2.1. Instead, the server S includes a timestamp T along with the 
session key Kab in Message 2. The Denning-Sacco protocol [15] is: 
Message 1 A^ S : A,B 
Message 2 A : {B,Kab,T,{A,Kab,T}KjKas 
Message 3 A ^ B : {A, Kab, 
Principals A and B verify that the messages received by them are not 
replays by checking the timestamp T. This requires that the clocks of the 
communicating principals be synchronized. 
Without Timestamps 
The modified Needham-Schtoeder protocol begins by the initiator, principal 
A, identifying himself to B: 
A-^B:A (1.7) 
Upon receiving the identity of the intending correspondent in message (1.7), 
principal B forwards to him a message intended for S containing a nonce J: 
(1.8) 
Principal A includes message (1.8) in its request to S: 
A^S:A,B,N.,{A,J}K,, (1.9) 
The server S decrypts the last component of message (1.9) and checks that 
the principal identified by B as the intending correspondent matches with 
the initiator, principal A. The server S then sends the following message to 
A: 
S^ A: {Na,B,Kal„{Kal„A,J}KjK.. (I-IO) 
Principal A decrypts message (1.10) and verifies its contents as in the 
original protocol and then forwards the part intended for B: 
A ^ B - . { K a l , A , J } K , . (1.11) 
Principal B is now ensured about the timeliness of the authenticator, 
unlike in the original protocol, due to the presence of the nonce J. The rest 
of the protocol proceeds as before. 
1.3 Formal Analysis of Protocols 
A large number of authentication protocols exist. Other examples of well-
known protocols are the Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [16], Otway-
Rees protocol [11], Kerberos protocol [13], Andrew secure RPC handshake 
14], Yahalom protocol [1], and the CCITT X.509 protocol [10]. The flawed 
Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol and the revised protocols described 
above highlight the variety possible when designing authentication protocols. 
The wide variety of protocols existing in practice exemplify the need for a 
technique to determine whether a protocol functions correctly or not and to 
investigate the nature of guarantees offered by different protocols. 
The main goal in formally analyzing a protocol is to ascertain the correct-
ness of the protocol. Protocols are typically described by listing the contents 
of the protocol messages along with their informal interpretation. In such an 
informal interpretation, there is a danger of hidden assumptions being left 
out, which can have serious consequences for protocol security. One of the 
goals, of formal analysis is to explicate the assumptions required for a given 
protocol to achieve its intended goal. In addition, many protocols contain 
redundancies, typically in the form of unnecessary encryption. Formal anal-
ysis can also help identify redundancies, which can be eliminated, thereby 
enhancing protocol efficiency. 
The logic of authentication due to Burrow, Abadi and Needham (hence-
forth referred to as the BAN logic) [1] is a formal calculus aimed at modelling 
the central concepts involved in authentication. It is the most well-known 
and widely used formalism for analyzing authentication protocols [2]. The 
logic has been successful in formally discovering flaws and redundancies in 
several protocols [1]. The next chapter describes the logic and illustrates its 
use by an example analysis. 
Chapter 2 
BAN Logic 
The BAN logic [1] formalizes the notions of trust and timeliness used in 
authentication protocols. This chapter describes the syntax and semantics 
of BAN logic [1]. The application of this logic is demonstrated by an analysis 
of the Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol. 
2.1 The Formalism 
BAN is a modal logic of belief. The logic has no explicit notion of time. 
Two epochs are considered to distinguish the time associated with messages. 
The present epoch begins with the opening message and ends with the last 
message of the protocol run under consideration. All messages sent before 
the present epoch are considered to be in the past. Negation is not provided 
in the logic. An inference made during a particular run holds for the entirety 
of that run. The syntax and inference rules of the BAN logic are given below. 
2.1.1 Syntax 
Protocol messages are represented by formulae which are also referred to as 
statements. Typically, the symbols A,B, and S denote principals, Kab,Kas, 
and Kbs denote shared keys, Ka.Kh, and Ks denote public keys, 
and denote the corresponding private keys, and Na,Nb, and Nc denote 
nonces. The symbols P, Q, etc. range over principals, K ranges over encryp-
tion keys, and X , Y, etc. range over formulas. 
Formulae 
The formulae of the logic are listed below together with their operational 
meanings. 
• P ^ X: P believes X. This is the principal construct of the logic. 
• P < X: P sees X. P has received a message X and is able to repeat it 
.in other messages. 
• P X: P once said X. P uttered X either in the past or present. 
• P X: P has jurisdiction over X. This construct is used to represent 
the notions of trust and delegation. 
• ^ is fresh; i.e., X has never appeared in any message sent in the 
past. 
• P Q\ P and Q may use the good shared key K to communicate. 
The key K will never be discovered by anyone except P or Q, or a 
principal trusted by either of them. 
• P: K IS the public key of P. The conjugate private key is denoted 
by K-\ 
X 
• P ^ Q: The shared secret X is known only to P and Q, and to 
principals trusted by them. It may be used by P and Q to prove their 
identities to one another. 
• {X}K' X encrypted with key K. It is an abbreviation for the longer 
expression {X}K from P, where P denotes the originator of { X } K ' 
• {X)Y' X combined with Y. The formula F is a secret and serves as a 
proof of origin for X. 
In addition, the conjunction of X and F, written as [X^Y)^ is also a 
formula. The properties of associativity and commutativity hold for con-
junctions, which are treated as sets. 
2.1.2 Inference Rules 
The inference rules of the logic formalize reasoning about authentication 
protocols. They specify relationships holding between formulae of the forms 
P and P < X . 
An inference rule is written in the form: , . . ., Xn 
Y 
Such a rule states that if X\ and . . . and Xn hold, then Y holds. In the 
inference rules given below, some rules are written adjacent to each other for 
the sake of convenience. 
• Message-meaning rules 
The message-meaning rules deal with the interpretation of messages. 
There are three message-meaning rules, as follows. 
For shared keys: 
p^qy^x 
i.e., if P believes that he shares the key K with Q and sees a message 
X encrypted with K, then P believes that Q sent X. 
For public keys: 
i.e., if P believes that K is the public key of Q and sees a message X 
encrypted with the private key of Q, then P believes that Q sent 
For shared secrets: 
i.e., if P believes that he shares the secret Y with Q and sees {X)^, 
then P believes that Q sent X. 
Nonce-verification rule 
The sender of a recent message is presumed to believe in it: 
i.e., if P believes that Q sent X in the current run, then P believes 
that Q believes X. 
Jurisdiction rule 
A principal trusts an authority on matters delegated to the authority: 
P^Q^X, P^Q^X 
P^X 
i.e., if P believes that Q has jurisdiction over X and believes that Q 
believes X , then P believes X. 
Belief rules 
These rules characterize the property of the belief operator: 
p^x,p^Y p^ {x,Y) p ^ g ^ 
P^{X,Y) P^X P^Q^X 
Utterance rule 
This rule characterizes the property of the "once said" operator: 
p^Qy-x 
Sight rules 
This rule characterizes the property of the "sees" operator: 
P<{X,Y) P < (X)y 
P<X P<X 
•Message decryption rules 
If a principal receives a message encrypted with a key he believes to 
be good for communicating with someone, then he sees the decrypted 
message: 
P<X 
If a principal receives a message encrypted with his public key, then he 
sees the decrypted message: 
P<X 
If a principal believes that K is the public key of someone and sees a 
message encrypted with the corresponding private key then he 
sees the decrypted message: 
K P ^ A Q, P < { X } ^ . , 
P<X 
• Freshness rule 
Freshness of at least one component of a formula implies that the whole 
formula is fresh: 
P N tt(^) 
P N iix, Y) 
• Bidirectionality rules 
A shared key or secret can be used between a pair of principals in either 
direction. The following rules reflect this symmetry: 
P ^ R ^ R ' P ^ Q ^ R ^ R ' 
P^R' ^ R P ^ Q ^ R ' ^ R 
In the message decryption rule for shared keys, P can only use shared 
keys believed to be good for communicating with some specified principal. 
This inference rule can be made more liberal by allowing for decryption with 
shared keys that are not known to be good. An additional inference rule of 
the logic provides such a mechanism: 
P<{X}K 
P<X 
i.e., P may use any key mentioned to him to decrypt the contents of an 
encrypted message. 
2.2 Protocol Analysis 
The main purpose in analyzing a protocol is to determine whether it achieves 
its intended goal. This requires the protocol itself and the initial assumptions 
and goal to be made explicit in the logic. The inference rules of the logic may 
then be applied to the assumptions and messages to determine the position 
attained by the principals. The three phases of protocol analysis in BAN 
logic are discussed below. 
2.2,1 Idealization 
Idealization is the process of transforming the informal description of a pro-
tocol into a form suitable for direct manipulation in the logic. In the idealized 
protocol, messages of the protocol are represented by corresponding logical 
formulae. An idealized protocol is a finite sequence of n "send" statements, 
Si,..., Sn, each of the form P Q : X, where the formula X represents the 
message sent by P to Q. 
The idealized protocol can viewed as a clearer description of the protocol. 
It is obtained from the informal description of the protocol by using the 
following guidelines. 
All messages sent in clear are omitted. The interpretation of the contents 
of the remaining messages is made explicit in the logic. In particular, the 
conditions required to hold for the messages to be sent are included in the 
idealized version. This requires understanding of the entire protocol. Proto-
col idealization cannot therefore be done by merely looking at each individual 
message in itself. 
2.2.2 Assumptions and Goal 
The assumptions describe the initial state of the principals and the goal 
specifies the intended outcome. The formulation of the assumptions and the 
goals of protocols in BAN logic is discussed below. 
Assumptions 
Principals in a protocol start with a set of initial beliefs. These initial beliefs 
form the assumptions of the protocol. Typically, the assumptions state the 
following: 
• The keys initially shared between the principals 
• The freshness of the nonces generated by various principals 
• The trust the clients have in the server to generate and distribute keys 
Goal 
The goal of a protocol describes the requirement for mutual authentication 
between the principals. For shared-key protocols, the requirement is that the 
principals be in the possession of the session key at the end of the protocol. 
The secure establishment of the shared key K between principals A and B 
is formalized as: 
A^A&B 
B^AiÎB 
These are referred to as first-order goals of A and B respectively. Some 
protocols are intended to further guarantee each principal that the other 
principal is in possession of the shared key. This requirement translates into 
beliefs about others' beliefs, called second-order goals: 
A^B^Ai^B 
BWA^Ai^B 
In public-key protocols intended for the secure transfer of public keys, the 
requirement for mutual authentication is that the principals be in possession 
of the public key of the other principal at the end of the protocol run. The 
secure transfer of public keys between the principals A and B having public 
keys Ka and Ki respectively is formalized as: 
A^I^B 
B^l^A 
The goals described above are the most commonly intended in protocols. 
Any other goals are generally obvious from the context. 
2.2.3 Annotation 
Once the protocol is idealized and the initial assumptions and goal of the 
protocol are made explicit, the analysis is carried out by annotating the 
idealized protocol with formulas and manipulating them with the inference 
rules. In the annotated protocol, assertions are inserted after each ideal-
ized message. An assertion is a set of formulas of the forms P ^ X and 
P <iX, tha t hold after the execution of the step they follow. The first as-
sertion contains the initial assumptions and the last contains the conclusions: 
{assumptions}Si{asseriion 1 } . . . {assertion n - l}Sn{conclusions} 
Annotation rules 
The rules to derive legal annotations are as follows. 
• The effect of executing a protocol step is that the sent message is seen 
by the recipient. All formulas that hold before the execution of this 
step hold after its execution: 
^{Y}{P-^Q:X){Y,Q<X} 
• Annotations can be concatenated: 
h •.• {Y}, h {r}^;...{Z} 
• Intermediate assertions and conclusions can be weakened by applying 
the inference rules to derive new assertions from existing ones: 
h {Y}s^ • • • {Xi} •. • {Xi} •. • {x„}, X.- h x; 
• The consequences of the assumptions can always be made explicit: 
h {X}S...{V}, Xh X' 
Let S denote the idealized protocol with the assumptions X and goal Y. 
The protocol is said to achieve its goal if the following theorem can be proved 
by using the annotation rules described above: 
h {X}5{F} 
The steps leading to the goal of mutual authentication typically involve 
application of the message-meaning, nonce-verification and jurisdiction in-
ference rules. In practice, annotated protocols are not used explicitly during 
the analysis since only the assumptions and conclusions are useful for the 
purpose of protocol verification. 
2.3 Semantics 
The semantics of the logic [1] is operational, in that it specifies how principals 
attain beliefs by computation. Principals obtain new beliefs by applying the 
inference rules of the logic to their current beliefs. 
The local state 5p of a principal P is characterized by two sets of formulae, 
Mp and Bp. The set Mp contains as its elements the messages seen by P , 
and Bp is the set of beliefs held by P. The closure properties of the sets 
Mp and Bp correspond to the inference rules of the logic. For example, if 
(P Q) e BP and {X}K € MP then X G Mp. 
A global state is a collection of the local states of principals executing the 
protocol. Typically, it is a triple containing the local states of A, B, and S. 
The local state of P in a global state 5 is denoted as and the corresponding 
message and beliefs sets are denoted as Mp{s) and Bp{s) respectively. The 
satisfaction relation between s and the formulas P ^ X , and P<]X is defined 
as follows. The formula P ^ X is satisfied in 5, or holds in 5, if X € Bp{s), 
and P<X holds in 5 if X € Mp{s). A set of formulas holds in a given state 
if each of its members holds in that state. 
A run is a finite sequence of global states SQ, • • •, in which the message 
and belief sets increase monotonically. In other words, for each principal P , 
Bp{si) C Bp{si+i) and Mp{si) C Mp{si^i) for 0 < i < n - 1. A run of 
a protocol, (Pi Qi : X i ) , . . . , (Pn ^ On : X^), is a run of length n + 1 
in which all prescribed messages are communicated, i.e., Xi G M-qX^i) ^̂ ^ 
all 1 < 2 < n. The initial state 5o of the run corresponds to the beliefs and 
messages which may be present before execution of the first send statement. 
An annotation for the protocol holds in a protocol run if all formulae in 
the annotation hold in the corresponding global states. It is valid if it holds 
in all runs of the protocol. The annotations rules given in Section 2.2.3 are 
sound and complete. This follows trivially by considering a protocol run 
in which only the prescribed messages are communicated. In such a run, all 
valid annotations must hold and conversely any annotation that holds in this 
run is derivable. 
The notion of a state introduced above gives a meaning to the ^ and < 
operators. To give a meaning to the remaining operators, the notion of a 
state is extended as described below. 
• In addition to Bp and Mp, the set Op of formulas once said by P is 
included in the local state of each principal P. The closure properties 
oi Op are: 
- if {{X}K from P) € OP, then X E OP 
- if (X)Y E OP, then X EOP 
- if {X,Y)eOp, then x e Op 
In addition, if the ¿th action of a protocol is Pi Qi : Xi, then 
the set of formulas once said increases only for P,; i.e., ii R ^ Pi, then 
OR{si) = OR{si-i) and Op- = Also, each principal believes 
formulas he said recently; i.e., if X G Op{s), then X G Bp. 
Finally, P X holds in state s ii X e Op. 
• Each principal P has jurisdiction over a set of formulas Jp. li X £ Jp 
and the belief P ^ X holds, then X also holds. 
The states in the run satisfy P X ii X £ Jp. 
• Each run assigns a set of good shared keys /C{P,Q} to each pair of 
principals (P ,Q) . Only appropriate principals use these keys; i.e., if 
R < {{X}K from R') holds and K G /C{P,Q}, then either R' = P and 
{{X}K from P) E Op or R' = Q and {{X}K from Q) G OQ. 
The states in the run satisfy P ¡i Q ii K £ 
• Each run assigns a set of good public keys Kp to each principal P . 
Only the appropriate principals can use the matching secret keys; i.e., 
if R<{{X}K-^ from R') holds and K G /Cp, then R'= P and {{X}K-^ 
from P ) G Op. 
The states in the run satisfy P ii K e JCp. 
• Each run assigns a set of shared secrets <S{P,Q} to each pair of principals 
(P,(9). These shared secrets are used only by appropriate principals; 
i.e., if < {X )Y holds and Y G S{P,Q}, then either {X)Y G OP or 
{X)y G OQ . 
X 
The states in the run satisfy P ^ Q ii X e «S{P,Q}. 
• Each run determines a set of fresh formulas T . The closure property 
of this set corresponds to the freshness rule; i.e., ii X e and X is a 
subformula of F , then Y G Also, ii X e J" and X G 0p{si), then 
X 3 Op{so). 
The states in the run satisfy jt(X) ii X e 
2.4 Proofs 
It is useful to formalize the notions of a proof in the logic, following [4]. 
Let A be a finite set of assumptions. Define the closure of A, denoted as 
A'^ to be the set of all formulae derivable from A by applying the inference 
rules of the logic. Let R denote the set of rule instances used in deriving the 
formulae in A'^ and let B = AU R. 
A proof of a formula c G A""" from B is a sequence of formulae S = 
(51 , . . . , Sn) such that Sn is c, and each Sj for j < n is in B and is either an 
assumption in A or is inferred from previous formulae in the sequence by a 
rule instance in R. 
The notion of equivalent proofs can be defined as follows. Let S' = 
. . . , be a proof of c from B. Then, S' is equivalent to S iin = n' and 
5 i , . . . , Sn-i are a permutation of . . . , 
Let B = { 6 1 , . . . , T h e index set of a proof of c from B is a set 
/ Ç { ! , . . . , m) such that {hi : z € / } form the proof. Let I denote the index 
set of a proof 5 of c from B. The proof S is minimal if there is no proof S' 
of c from B whose index set I' is such that I' C I. 
During protocol analysis, the goal of a principal is in general expressed 
as one or more logical formulae. Informally, a redundant assumption is a 
formula whose exclusion does not prevent the goal from being attained. This 
notion can be formalized in terms of the minimal proofs of the desired goal, 
as follows. 
Let G = {51, . . . , denote the desired goal of a principal. A redundant 
assumption of the principal is a formula s such that for every ¿i, there exists 
at least one minimal proof of which does not contain s. 
2.5 Example Analysis 
This section presents the BAN logic analysis of the Needham-Schroeder 
shared-key protocol. This protocol has a serious flaw, as pointed out in the 
last chapter. The analysis given below demonstrates how BAN logic analysis 
is successful in discovering this flaw. The Needham-Schroeder shared-key 
protocol is: 
Message 1 A^ S : A, B, Na 
Message 2 S A : {N,, B, K^,, {KaB, A}kJk.^ 
Message 3 A B : {Kab, 
Message 4 
Messages A B : {Nb - l}Kab 
Idealized Protocol 
Following the guidelines given in Section 2.2.1, the idealized protocol ob-
tained is: 
Message 2 S A : {N^, A^h'B, {A^h'BjK^K^. 
Messages A ^ B : {A^' 
Message 4 B ^ A : {Nb, A^h" 
Message 5 A ^ B : { N b , A ^ ' 
The idealized protocol consists of only four messages instead of five in 
the original protocol. This is because the first message, which is in cleartext, 
is omitted. The idealization of message 2 is done as follows. The sequence 
B,Kab in the original message is replaced by the formula A B. This is 
because upon decrypting this message A finds the nonce Na and the identifier 
of the intended recipient, principal B, both sent by A in his request to S and 
is thus assured about Kab- Similarly, in the authenticator for B, the sequence 
Kabi A is replaced by the formula A^ B since S certifies Kah for B as well. 
The formula A B 
is included in the last two messages of the idealized 
protocol since they are meant to assure each principal that the other believes 
that Kab is good. 
Assumptions and Goal 






AhS A^B B^SU^ A^ B 
A N i{Na) B N iW 
The first four assumptions regarding the initial keys shared between the 
clients and the server are obvious. The assumption S ^ A ^ B states that 
S knows the session key. The next two assumptions indicate the trust the 
clients have in S to generate session keys. The last two assumptions state 
that the nonces are generated by principals who consider them to be fresh. 
The aim of the protocol is to leave both chents in the possession of the 
shared session key and to assure them that the other is in possession of this 
key. The goal is thus formalized as: 
A ^ A ^' B B^A^'B 
Analysis 
Applying the message-meaning rule to Message 2 we have: 
A^ S ^ {Na^A'h' B.lA'h' B}KJ 
The freshness of the message obtained above can be deduced by applying 
the freshness rule: 
A N W 
By applying the nonce-verification rule we have: 
A N A B, {A ^^ B}KJ, ^^ B, {A ^ ^ B}KJ 
A^S^(Na,A B, {A 'k B}kJ 
28 
By applying the belief rule we have: 
B, {A ^^ B]KJ 
A^S^A^^'B 
Finally, by applying the jurisdiction rule we obtain the first-order goal 
of A: 
A^ S A^^' B, A^ S ^ A^^' B 
A^A'h' B 
Principal A then forwards the authenticator for B as Message 3. By 
applying the message-meaning rule we have: 
B^Sy^A^^'B 
Principal B cannot make further deductions to attain his first-order goal 
since he knows of nothing in the message sent by S to be fresh. The only 
way B can proceed further is to assume that the message sent by S is not a 
replay. This extra assumption can be stated as B ^ jj(A ^ B). Once this 
dubious assumption is made B can derive his first-order goal by applying the 
nonce-verification and jurisdiction rules as follows: 




B^S Kab K„ 
B^A'h' B 
The nonce handshake at the end of the protocol is intended to assure 
each client that the other is in possession of the shared key. By applying the 
message-meaning rule to Message 4 we have: 
B) 
Now, A is unable to proceed further to derive his second-order goal be-
cause he knows of nothing in the message sent by B to be fresh. This high-
lights the need for the server to always make sure that the key he generates 
Kab 
is fresh, and to tell A so. The first requirement is expressed as the additional 
r\. K assumptions 5 ^ {(A B) and A ^ S ^{A B). The second require-
ment is incorporated by including the formula J (A B) in the idealized 
Message 2. The modified idealized Message 2 is: 
Message 2 S A : {Na, A^h' B, ^{A B), {A "h' 
Once this is done, the previous deductions made by A by applying the 
message-meaning rule and the nonce-verification rule are modified to include 
the formula i{A B) in the message sent by S. One more application of 
the belief rule leads to: 
A^S^iNa^A'h' B, i{A B\ {A B}KJ 
A^S^^iiA'h' B) 
The jurisdiction rule then enables A to deduce the freshness of Kab-
A ^ HA ^^ B) 
Hence, A is now able to apply the nonce-verification rule to the message 
sent by B and obtain his second-order goal: 
A ^ B ^ A ' h ' B 
The derivation of the second-order goal of B proceeds as follows. Principal 
B applies the message-meaning rule to Message 5: 
B ^ A h 
By applying the freshness rule: 
B N ttW) 
By applying the nonce-verification rule: 
K, 
B^A^iNb.A'h'B) 
Finally, by applying the belief rule we obtain the second-order goal of B: 
B^A^A^'B 
It is clear that once the dubious assumption is made, B can send anything, 
not necessarily a nonce, encrypted with Kab as Message 4 and will still be 
able to attain his second-order goal. Hence the assumption B ^ tK^fe) 
redundant. Also, it can be verified that the protocol achieves its goal even if 
S does not encrypt the authenticator for B with Kas-
This completes the analysis of the protocol. The analysis shows how the 
flaw is manifested by the need to make a dubious assumption. It also brings 
out the requirement for the additional assumptions regarding the freshness 
of the session key in order for A to be able to achieve his second-order goal. 
It further points out the redundancy in the assumption set and shows that 
eliminating the double encryption in Message 2 does not weaken the protocol. 
2.6 Protocol Verification 
As seen by the example analysis presented above, protocol verification in 
BAN logic amounts to proving the desired goal by applying the inference 
rules to the assumptions and the idealized protocol. To start analyzing a 
protocol, the usual assumptions are made in the beginning and deductions 
possible using the inference rules are performed. Finally, the assumptions 
are refined until the goal is achieved. The protocol is flawed if a dubious 
assumption is required to achieve the goal. In addition, various forms of re-
dundancy can also be identified by verifying that the goal is achieved even af-
ter simplifying the protocol. This simplification usually involves eliminating 
double encryption and redundant assumptions. The next chapter discusses 
the mechanization of protocol verification in BAN logic. 
Chapter 3 
Machine-aided BAN Analysis 
This chapter describes a protocol analyzer program, written in Prolog, which 
automates BAN logic analysis of protocols. Machine-aided analysis of the 
Needham-Schroeder shared-key protocol carried out by the protocol analyzer 
illustrates how this program aids in identifying flaws and redundancies in 
protocols. 
3.1 Introduction 
In automating BAN logic, the readiness of this formalism for mechanization 
needs to be considered. The first step in analyzing a protocol is idealization — 
the process of transforming the informal notation describing the protocol into 
logical formulae. A parser can be written to perform this task if precise rules 
to carry out idealization exist. However, no such rules exist for BAN logic, 
and idealization is only possible after the protocol is intuitively understood. 
Thus idealization has to be carried out manually by following the guidelines 
mentioned in Section 2.2.1. 
Once idealization is done, initial assumptions are made and inference rules 
are applied to derive the statements held by the principals as a consequence 
of the message exchange. During analysis, the process of deriving statements 
by applying the inference rules may be repeated several times as new as-
sumptions are found to be necessary for the protocol to achieve its intended 
goal. This process is amenable to mechanization, and a program capable of 
inferencing can serve as a useful tool in the analysis. 
It is desirable that such a program have the following features and capa-
bilities: 
• Protocol-Independence 
The inference rules built into the program must be independent of any 
specific protocol; i.e., the inference rules need not be re-written or re-
ordered for each protocol to be analyzed. 
• Open-ended Analysis 
The program should not be restricted to verifying whether a particular 
statement in the logic holds for the input protocol. It should generate 
the complete set of statements describing the state of the principals 
at the end of the protocol run. In some cases the same statement can 
be derived from alternate premises or by applying a different inference 
rule. The program should be capable of generating all derivations of 
the inferred statements. This enables identification of redundant as-
• sumptions and is also a pre-requisite for probabilistic BAN analysis [4], 
which is discussed in the next chapter. 
• Proof Explanation 
The program should provide a proof-explanation facility to generate a 
stepwise description of the inferences leading to a particular statement 
which holds for the input protocol. This facility is useful to obtain 
machine-generated proofs of goals achieved by protocols. It can also 
help identify the possible reasons for the failed proof of a desired goal, 
by permitting manual inspection of the proof of some weaker conclu-
sion. 
A NU-Prolog [17] program to automate BAN logic analysis is proposed 
in [61. This program suffers from a number of drawbacks. Although the 
inference rules built into the program are not specific to a particular protocol, 
the program is not protocol-independent. The program is sensitive to the 












Figure 3.1: Protocol Analysis. 
while analyzing different protocols. There is no way of knowing beforehand 
the correct clause order which prevents an infinite loop while analyzing a 
given protocol. As a result ad hoc manual re-ordering of the program clauses 
is required. Also, the program does not provide open-ended analysis, as the 
search path for satisfying a goal is closed when only one solution is found. 
Further, the program lacks a proof explanation facility. One more Prolog 
program for mechanizing BAN logic analysis is proposed in [5]. The main 
limitation of this program is that it is protocol-specific and requires re-writing 
of the program clauses for each protocol to be analyzed. 
The next section outlines the strategy used in a protocol analyzer program 
which overcomes the limitations of the programs proposed in [6, 5]. 
3.2 The Protocol Analyzer 
Figure [3.1] illustrates the approach used in the program we have developed. 
The analyzer module is the protocol-independent component of the system. 
It takes as input a protocol specification in the form of idealized messages 
and assumptions. The analyzer uses a forward-chaining control strategy to 
generate all statements that can be derived by applying the inference rules 
to the protocol specification, and stores these statements in a database. It 
repeatedly cycles through the inference rules and the statements stored in 
the database until no more statements can be added to the database. A 
statement is added either if it has not been derived earlier or a new derivation 
of it is found. The latter occurs when a statement can be derived from a 
different set of premises, or by an application of a different inference rule, than 
used in earlier derivations. Forward-chaining terminates upon exhausting 
all derivations of the statements attained by the principals executing the 
protocol. The set of statements describing the state of the principals at the 
end of the protocol can then be examined by inspecting the database. A proof 
of a statement that holds for the protocol can be constructed by following 
the inference steps stored in the database leading to this statement. 
The Prolog program developed using the approach given above is dis-
cussed in the next section. 
3.3 The Prolog Program 
The representation of the BAN logic constructs in our program, and the 
main predicates defined in the program, are described below. The complete 
program is given in Appendix C. 
3.3.1 Structures 
Each BAN logic formula is represented by a Prolog structure. The following 
structures are used to represent formulae of the logic: 
Prolog Structure BAN Formula 
believes(P, X) P^X 
sees(P, X) P<X 
oncesaid(P, X) PY-X 
jurisdiction(P, X) P^X 
fresh(X) i(^) 
goodkeyCK, P, Q) P^^Q 
public((K, P) i^P 
v 
secret(X, P, Q) P^Q 
encrypt(K, X) {X}k 
combined(Y, X) {X}y 
In addition the structure sends (P, Q, F) is used to represent the step 
P Q : F, where F is the formula denoting the idealized message. The 
private key is represented by the structure inv(K). Conjunctions are 
represented as lists of the structures defined above. Principals, keys and 
nonces are denoted by constant symbols. 
3.3.2 Predicates 
The function of the various predicates defined in the Prolog program is dis-
cussed below. In what follows, the notation P/N denotes the predicate 
named P with arity N. 
Representing Statements 
The predicate fact/3 is used to represent a statement and its derivation. It 
takes the form: 
fact(Index, Formula, reason(PremIs, Rule)) 
where Formula is bound to a structure representing a statement. The integer 
argument Index is used to index instances of fact/3 in the database. The 
third argument stores information about the derivation of Formula. Specif-
ically, Premis is a list containing the indices of the facts representing the 
statements used as premises in the derivation of Formula by an application 
of inference rule Rule. The list Premis is empty if Formula is either an as-
sumption or a protocol message, and Rule is then 'Assumption' or 'Step\ 
Forward-chaining 
The top-level predicate is analyze/1 and takes as its argument the name 
of the file containing facts defining the idealized messages and assumptions 
of the protocol to be analyzed. It does initialization and starts forward-
chaining. During initialization the facts defining the protocol are loaded 
into the program database and the effect of executing each protocol step 
P -^'Q : F is recorded by asserting the fact representing Q <F. Forward-
chaining is performed by the predicate f orward/1: 
y, forward (Cycle) - Main Driver 
y. Repeatedly applies the inference rules of the logic. It 
y, succeeds when no new statements can be derived. The 
y, argument Cycle is incremented with every rule cycle 
y, performed, 
forward(Cycle) : -
Cycle > 0, 
done, 
write('Analyzed in O , write(Cycle), write(' cycles'), nl. 
forward(Cycle) 
apply_rules, 
NextCycle is Cycle + 1, 
forward(NextCycle) . 
The predicate apply_rules/0 applies the inference rules of the logic by 
invoking various two-arity predicates named after them. A call to a predicate 
defining an inference rule binds its first argument to the conclusion entailed 
by the inference rule and binds its second argument to the derivation infor-
mation of this conclusion. A failure-driven loop forces all inference rules to 
be applied to the facts stored in the database. 
y, apply_rules - Applies all inference rules 
y. Applies inference rules to the facts in the database 




















The inference rules belonging to the same group are defined as separate 
clauses of the predicate defining them. For example, the belief rules are 
defined as separate clauses of the predicate belief/2: 
•/, Belief rules 
belief(believes(P, M), reason([I], 'Belief')) 
fact(I, believes(P, L), _), 
member(M, L). 
belief(believes(P, believes(Q, M)), reason([I], 'Belief')) 
factd, believes(P, believes(Q, L)), _), 
member(M, L). 
The last clause of apply-rules/O is a fact apply_rules. Thus the goal 
apply-rules always succeeds at the end of the current cycle. A test is made 
at the beginning of every cycle to determine whether any statements were 
added during the previous cycle. The predicate done/0 is used for this pur-
pose. If no statements have been added to the program database in the 
previous cycle, then done succeeds and forward-chaining terminates. Other-
wise, the cycle number is updated and the next cycle is invoked recursively. 
Proof Explanation 
The predicate explain_proof/I provides a stepwise description of proofs of 
statements which hold for the input protocol. The goal explain_proof (Goal) 
invokes the predicate build_proof/2 to build a list Proof containing the in-
dices of the database facts which were used in a derivation of Goal. This 
list is then passed to the predicate write_proof/I which prints the format-
ted proof. A failure-driven loop forces explain_proof (Goal) to output all 
proofs of Goal: 
7. explain_proof (Goal) - Proof Explanation 







y, build.proof(Goal, Proof) - Builds index list of proofs 
y. The list Proof represents a minimal proof of statement Goal, 
build.proof(Goal, Proof) :-
fact(Index, Goal, _), 
proof(Index, ProofDup), 
remove.dups([Index I ProofDup] , RevProof), 
reverse(RevProof, Proof). 
The goal build_proof (Goal, Proof) invokes the predicate proof /2 which 
traverses the database facts used in a derivation of Goal and returns their 
indices in the list Proof Dup. The list Proof Dup is further processed to elim-
inate duplicate indices in it which can occur when the same fact is used as 
a premise in more than one inference step in the derivation. The list with-
out duplicates, RevProof, is finally reversed to obtain the list Proof. The 
list Proof represents a minimal proof of Goal because only the database 
facts leading to a derivation of Goal are traversed while constructing this 
list. Also, since the database facts are traversed in the order they are linked 
together, this list is one representative member of an equivalence class of 
minimal proofs of Goal. The predicate proof/2 is defined as: 
•/, proof (Index, ProofDup) - Traverses database 
•/, Traverses the database to build the list ProofDup containing 
y, the indices of facts used in a derivation of the fact with 
•/, index Index, 
proof(Index, ProofDup) 
fact(Index, _, reason(Premises, _)), 
append(Premises, ProofOfPremises, ProofDup), 
prooflist(Premises, ProofOfPremises). 
prooflist([] , []). 
prooflist([Premise I Premises], TotalProof) :-
proof(Premise, ProofOfPremise), 
prooflist(Premises, ProofOfPremises), 
append(ProofOfPremise, ProofOfPremises, TotalProof). 
The predicate write_proof/2 produces a formatted output of the proof 
from the list Proof Is. The proof is output as a sequence of steps leading to 
the conclusion G: 
•/, write.proof(Proof) - Prints proof 
•/, Prints formatted proof from the list Proof. 
write.proof(Proof) 
write.proof(Proof, Proof). 
write_proof ([] , _) . 
write_proof( [Index I Indices] , Proof) 
fact(Index, Formula, reason(Premises, Rule)), 
ith(StepNo, Proof, Index), 
write(StepNo) , write('.0, 
writeC '), write (Formula) , tab(2), 
w r i t e C i O , 
write_list(Premises, Proof), write(Rule), 
w r i t e O O , nl, 
write_proof(Indices, Proof). 
The steps of the proof are numbered consecutively and each step is printed on 
a new line. Each step contains either an assumption or a conclusion drawn 
from statements in earlier lines. The inference rule and the line numbers 
of the premises used in deriving a statement are listed to the right of each 
statement. 
Avoiding Infinite Loops 
In the database there can be several instances of f act/3 containing the same 
statement. These multiple facts for the same statement correspond to dif-
ferent derivations of this statement. A check is made before adding the fact 
representing a derivation to determine whether its insertion in the database 
would result in an infinite loop. Such a loop can arise either if the inference 
has already been made earlier or the derived statement is itself used earlier in 
the derivation of one of the premises being used in the current derivation. It 
is easy to realize the need for this check by considering repeated application 
of the bidirectionality inference rule. The predicate check/2 is used to detect 
derivations which would lead to infinite loops: 
•/. check (Formula, Reason) - Loop checker 
y. Succeeds if insertion of the fact representing the derivation 
•/, of the statement Formula whose derivation information is in 
•/, Reason would lead to an infinite loop; fails otherwise. 
•/, Inference already made 
check(Formula, Reason) 




•/, Check if the inferred statement Formula was used earlier in 
y, deriving a premise in Premis 
check(Formula, reason(Premis, _)) 
f i n d a l K Index, fact(Index, Formula, _) , Indices), 




•/, New derivation 
check(_, _) . 
c h e c k a l K G , .) . 
checkall ( [Premlndex I Premlndices] , Indices) :-
proof(Premlndex, ProofOfPrem), 
intersectiondndices, [Premlndex I Proof Of Prem] , []), 
checkall(Premlndices, Indices). 
R e d u n d a n t Assumptions 
Redundant assumptions can be detected from the multiple proofs of the 
desired goal arising out of them. The predicate goal/1 is used to define the 
desired goals of various principals. It takes the form goal (Goal) where Goal 
is bound to the structure representing a desired goal of a principal. 
The top-level predicate for detecting redundant assumptions is chk_red/3. 
The goal chk_red(P, RedAssumption, MinAssumptions) succeeds when the 
list MinAssumptions is a minimal set of assumptions of principal P, which is 
required to attain the desired goal of P, excluding a redundant assumption 
RedAs sumption. 
y, chk_red(P, RedAs sumption, MinAssumptions) 
*/, Identifies redundant assumptions 
y. The list MinAssumptions is the minimal set of assumptions 
•/, excluding a redundant assumption RedAssumption of principal P. 
chk_red(P, RedAssumption, MinAssumptions) :-
findall(Assumption, is_ass(P, Assumption, _), Assumptions), 
is_ass(P, RedAssumption, Index), 
findalKGoal, (goal(Goal), arg(l. Goal, P)), Goals), 
Goals \= [] , 
chk_allfmla(Index, Goals), 
select(RedAssumption, Assumptions, MinAssumptions). 
y, is_ass(P, Assumption, Index) - Gets assumptions 
y. Index is the index of the database fact representing 
y, the assumption Assumption of principal P. 
is_ass(P, Assumption, Index) :-
factdndex. Assumption, reason([], 'Assumption')), 
arg(l. Assumption, P). 
y, chk_allfmla(Index, Formulae) - Checks proofs of all formulae 
chk_allfmla(_, []). 
chk.allfmladndex, [Formula I Formulae] ) :-
chk.fmla(Index, Formula), 
chk_allfmla(Index, Formulae). 
The goal chk_fmla(Index, Formula) builds the list of minimal proofs, 
Proofs, of a statement Formula. It then invokes the predicate chk_proof/2 
to check whether the database fact with index Index is redundant for attain-
ing Formula: 
y, chk_fmla(Index, Formula) - Checks all proofs of a formula 
chk_fmla(Index, Formula) ;-
findall(Proof, build.proof(Formula, Proof), Proofs), 
chk.proof(Index, Proofs). 
The goal chk_proof (Index, Proofs) succeeds when a proof whose index 
set does not contain Index is found in the list of proofs Proofs: 
chk.proof(Index, [ P r o o f l . ] ) : -
not(member(Index, P r o o f ) ) , 
! , 
chk.proof (Index, LI Proofs]) : -
chk.proof(Index, Proofs) . 
3.4 The Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key Pr-
otocol 
The application of the protocol analyzer program as a tool in the BAN anal-
ysis of protocols is now illustrated by means of an example. In Chapter 2 
it was shown how BAN logic analysis of the Needham-Schroeder shared-key 
protocol exposes the flaw and redundancies in the protocol. The use of the 
protocol analyzer program as an aid in the BAN logic analysis of this protocol 
is demonstrated below. 
3.4.1 Program Representation 
Each idealized message and assumption described in Section 2.5 is defined 
as a separate instance of fact /3 . The following set of facts comprising the 
protocol specification are stored in a file named "nssk": 
V. Idealized protocol 
factd, sends(s, a, encryptCkas, [na, goodkey(kab, a, b), encryptCkbs, goodkey(kab, a, b))])) 
reason([], 'Step')). 
fact(2, sendsCa, b, encryptCkbs, goodkeyCkab, a, b))), reasonCC], 'Step')). 
fact(3, sendsCb, a, encrypt(kab, [nb, goodkeyCkab, a, b)])), reasonCC], 'Step')). 
factC4, sendsCa, b, encryptCkab, [nb, goodkeyCkab, a, b)])), reasonCC], 'Step')). 
y. Assumptions 
factCS, believesCa, goodkeyCkas, a, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factC6, believesCa, jurisdictionCs, goodkeyC., a, b))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factC7, believesCa, freshCna)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCS, believesCb, goodkeyCkbs, b, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factC9, believesCb, jurisdictionCs, goodkeyC., a, b))), reasonCC]» 'Assumption')). 
f a c t d O , believesCb, freshinb)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
f a c t d l , believesCs, goodkeyCkbs, b, s ) ) , reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(12, believes(s, goodkeyCkab, a, b ) ) , reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(13, believes(s, goodkey(kas, a, s ) ) , reason([], 'Assumption')). 
3.4.2 Open-ended Analysis 
Open-ended analysis is performed by invoking the goal analyze (nssk): 
[ns loaded] 
Analyzed in 4 cycles 
The statements attained by the principals during the execution of the pro-
tocol can be obtained by inspecting the database: 
I ?- listing(fact/3) . 
fact (1 , sends (s , a, encrypt (kas, [na,goodkey(kab, a,b) , encrypt (kbs,goodkey(kab, a,b) )] ) ) , 
reasonC[],Step)). 
fact (2 , sends (a, b, encrypt (kbs, goodkey (kab, a, b ) ) ) , reason ( [] , St ep)) . 
fact (3 , sends (b, a, encrypt (kab, [nb,goodkey (kab, a ,b)] ) ) , reason ( • .Step)) . 
fact (4 , sends (a, b, encrypt (kab, [nb,goodkey (kab, a ,b)])) , reason ( • ,St ep)) . 
fact(5,believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,s)) ,reason(D .Assumption)). 
fact(6,believes(a, jurisdiction(s,goodkey(A,a,b))) ,reason(n .Assumption)) . 
fact (7.believes (a.fresh (na)) ,reason([] .Assumption)). 
fact(8.believes(b,goodkey(kbs.b.s)) .reason(D .Assumption)). 
f act (9 , believes (b.jurisdiction(s.goodkey (A. a. b ) ) ) .reason(D .Assumption)) . 
fact(10.believes(b,fresh(nb)) .reason(n .Assumption)). 
f a c t d l .believes(s.goodkey (kbs.b.s)) ,reason([] .Assumption)) . 
fact(12.believes(s,goodkey(kab,a.b)) .reason([] .Assumption)) . 
fact(13,believes(s.goodkey(kas.a.s)) .reason([] .Assumption)). 
f act (14. sees (a. encrypt (kas. [na. goodkey (kab. a. b) . encrypt (kbs. goodkey (kab. a. b))] ) ) . 
reason([l].Seeing)). 
fact (15. sees (b. encrypt (kbs. goodkey (kab. a. b) ) ) . reason ( [2] . Seeing)) . 
factdp.sees(a.encrypt(kab.[nb.goodkey(kab.a.b)])) .reason([3] .Seeing)). 
factd7,sees(b,encrypt(kab. [nb.goodkey(kab.a.b)])) ,reason([4] .Seeing)). 
fact (18. bel ieves (a. goodkey (kas. s . a)) . reason ( [5] . Bidirect ionality ) ) . 
fact (19. bel ieves (b. goodkey (kbs. s ,b) ) . reason ( [8] . Bidirect ionality) ) . 
fact(20.believes(s,goodkey(kbs.s.b)) .reason([ll] .Bidirectionality)) . 
fact(21 ,believes(s .goodkey(kab.b.a)) .reason([12] .Bidirectionality)) . 
fact(22.believes(s.goodkey (kas, s .a)) ,reason([13] .Bidirectionality)) . 
fact (23. sees (a. [na. goodkey (kab. a. b) .encrypt (kbs.goodkey(kab.a.b))]) . 
reason([18,14].Message decryption)). 
fact(24,sees(b.goodkey(kab.a.b)).reason([19.15].Message decryption)). 
fact(25,believes(a.oncesaid(s. [na.goodkey(kab,a,b) .encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a.b))])). 
reason([18,14].Message meaning)). 
fact(26.believes(b.oncesaid(s.goodkey(kab,a.b))) .rea£on([19,15] .Message meaning)). 
fact (27. believes(a,fresh([na, goodkey (kab, a, b) , encrypt (kbs,goodkey (kab. a .b) )] ) ) . 
reason([7].Freshness)). 




fact (31,believes(a .believes(s,encrypt (kbs,goodkey(kab. a,b) ) ) ) , reason( [28] ,Belief) ) . 
fact(32,believes(a,oncesaid(s,na)) .reason([25] .Utterance)). 
fact(33,believes(a,oncesaid(s,goodkey(kab.a,b))),reason([25] .Utterance)). 
fact(34,believes(a,oncesaid(s .encrypt(kbs.goodkey(kab.a.b)))) ,reason([25] .Utterance)). 
fact (35. believes (a .goodkey (kab. a ,b) ) , reason ( [6.30] . Jurisdiction)) . 
fact(36,believes(a.goodkey(kab,b.a)) ,reason([35] .Bidirectionality)). 
fact (37 ,believes(a.believes(s .goodkey(kab,b .a) )) ,reason( [30] .Bidirectionality)). 
fact (38, sees (a, na) . reason ( [23] .Sight) ) . 
fact (39, sees (a, goodkey (kab. a. b) ) . reason ( [23] . S ight)). 
fact(40,sees(a,encrypt (kbs,goodkey(kab.a.b))) .reason([23] .Sight)) . 
fact(41 ,sees(a, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)]) ,reason([36,16] .Message decryption)) . 
f act (42, sees (b,[nb,goodkey (kab, a,b)]) ,reason( [26,17] .Message decryption)) . 
fact(43.believes(a,oncesaid(b.[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) ,rea8on([36,16] .Message meaning)). 
fact(44,believes(a,believes(s,na)) ,reason([7,32] .lonce verification)). 
fact(45,believes(a,oncesaid(b.nb)) .reason([43] .Utterance)). 
fact(46.believes(a.oncesaid(b,goodkey(kab.a.b))) ,reason([43] .Utterance)). 
fact (47, sees (a, nb ) , reason ( [41] , Sight) ) . 
fact (48, sees (a, goodkey (kab, a, b)) .reason ([41] .Sight)) . 
fact(49,sees(b,nb) ,reason([42] ,Sight)) . 
fact (50, sees (b, goodkey (kab, a, b) ) , reason ( [42] , Sight) ) . 
yes 
This database can then be queried to determine whether the protocol 
achieves its intended goal: 
I ?- fact(_, believes(a, goodkey(kab, a, b)), _). 
yes 
I ?- fact(_, believes(a, believes(b, goodkey(kab, a, b))). _). 
no 
I ?- fact(_, believes(b. goodkey(kab, a, b)), _). 
no 
I ?- fact(_, believes(b, believes(a, goodkey(kab, a. b))). _). 
The results of the above queries show that for the given assumptions only 
the first-order goal of A is achieved. The proof oi A^ A ^ B \s\ 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(a. goodkey(kab. a, b))), 
1, sends(s,a,encrypt(kas, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b). encrypt (kbs .goodkey (kab. a.b))] )) {Step} 
2. believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
3. see8(a,encrypt(kas,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,encrypt(kb8,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) {1, Seeing} 
4. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {2, Bidirectionality} 
5. believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
6. believes (a, oncesaid(s, [na,goodkey (kab,a,b), encrypt (kbs .goodkey (kab, a,b))] )) 
{4, 3, Message meaning} 
7. believes(a,fresh([na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) {5, Freshness} 
8. believes(a,believes(s,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) 
{7, 6, lonce verification} 
9. believes(a,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {8, Belief} 
10. believes(a,jurisdiction(s.goodkey(.1259604,a,b))) {Assumption} 
11. believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {10, 9, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
The following observations can be made by inspecting the statements 
stored in the database. Principal A attains the weaker conclusion A ^ J5 
A ^ B (fact no. 46) in place of his second-order goal A ^ B ^ A ^ B. 
Principal B achieves the weak conclusion B ^ S 
A ' ^ ' B (fact no. 26) in 
place of his first-order goal B ^ A^ B. 
The weak conclusion reached by B suggests that B must make the addi-
tional assumption B ^ A ^ B) to attain his first-order goal. Once this 
dubious assumption is made, B achieves both his goals. The proof of his 
first-order goal is shown below: 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(b, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
1. sends(a,b,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {Step} 
2. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
3. sees(b,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {1, Seeing} 
4. believes(b,goodkey(kb8,s,b)) {2, Bidirectionality} 
5. believes(b,oncesaid(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {4, 3, Message meaning} 
6. believes(b,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b))) {Assumption} 
7. believes(b,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {6, 5, lonce verification} 
8. believes(b,jurisdiction(s,goodkey(_1258748,a,b))) {Assumption} 
9. believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {8, 7, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
The four proofs of the second-order goal of B are given in Appendix B.2. 
By inspecting the weak conclusion reached by A in place of his second-order 
goal, it is clear that A can attain this goal if the key Kab generated by 
S is fresh. This requirement is expressed by the additional assumptions 
S ^ ^ B) a,nd A^ S ^ B). Also, the idealized Message 2 is 
modified to include the additional formula |t(A ^^ B). With these changes 
made, it can be verified by running the program again that A attains his 
second-order goal. This also gives rise to an alternate derivation for the 
first-order goal of A cis shown below: 
1. sends (s, a,encrypt (kas, [na,goodkey(kab, a,b) ,fresh (goodkey(kab, a,b)) , 
encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) {Step} 
2. believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
3. sees(a,encrypt(kas,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)), 
encrypt(kbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))])) {1, Seeing} 
4. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {2, Bidirectionality} 
5. believes(a,oncesaid(s, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) , 
encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))])) {4, 3, Message meaning} 
6. believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
7. believes(a,fresh([na,goodkeyCkab,a,b) ,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)) , 
encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))])) {6, Freshness} 
8. believesCa,believesCs, [na,goodkeyCkab,a,b) ,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)), 
encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))])) {7, 5, lonce verification} 
9. believesCa,believesCs,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)))) {8, Belief} 
10. believesCa,jurisdictionCs,freshCgoodkeyC_1261200,a,b)))) {Assumption} 
11. believesCa,oncesaidCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {5, Utterance} 
12. believesCa,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b))) {10, 9, Jurisdiction} 
13. believesCa,believesCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {12, 11, lonce verification} 
14. believes Ca, jurisdictionCs ,goodkeyC_1261444 ,a ,b))) {Assumption} 
15. believesCa,goodkeyCkab,a,b)) {14, 13, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
The alternate proof of A ^ A ^^ B given above arises as follows. 
Principal A first deduces 1{A ^ B) as a nonce from Message 2 by using 
A ^ 5 ^ B)- The freshness of this nonce is further used to obtain 
K Kb 
A ^ S ^ A B from which A ^ A ^ B follows by applying the jurisdic-
tion rule cis before. The three proofs of the second-order goal of A are given 
in Appendix B.2. The following table gives the number of minimal proofs of 
the goals of principals A and B: 
Goal No. of Proofs 
A^A^'B 2 
B^A^'B 1 
A^B^A^^' B 4 
B^A^A^^'B 3 
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3.4.3 Redundant Assumptions 
The goal of the protocol is represented by defining a separate fact of goal / I 
for each formula to be attained, as follows. 
I ?- [user]. 
goal(believes(a, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(a, believes(b, goodkey(kab, a, b)))). 
goal(believes(b, goodkeyCkab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(b, believes(a, goodkeyCkab, a, b)))). 
[user compiled, cpu time used: 0.29102 seconds] 
[user loaded] 
yes 
The assumptions made by principal A are: 
I ?- is_ass(a, A, .). 
A = believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,s)); 
A = believesCa, jurisdiction(s,goodkey(_1257304,a,b))); 
A = believes(a, jurisdiction(s,fresh(goodkey(_12573i2,a,b)))) ; 
A = believes(a,fresh(na)); 
The following query shows that no assumption made by A is redundant: 
I ?- chk.red(a, A, As), 
no 
For principal B, the assumptions made are: 
I ?- is_ass(b. A, .). 
A = believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)); 
A = believes(b, jurisdiction(s,goodkey(_1267304,a,b))); 
A = believes(b,fresh(nb)); 
A = believes(b,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b))) ; 
no 
The following query returns the redundant assumption made by B\ 
I ?- chk_red(b, A, As). 
A = believes(b,fresh(nb)) 
As = [believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) ,believes(b, jurisdiction(s,goodkey(_1257384,a, 
b))),believes(b,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)))] ; 
Also, it can be checked that the double encryption in Message 2 is redun-
dant by mechanically verifying that the protocol achieves its intended goal 
even if {A,Kab}Kbs is not encrypted with Kas in this message. 
3.5 Remarks 
The protocol analyzer program described in Section 3.3 serves as a useful 
tool in the BAN logic analysis of protocols. Machine-aided BAN analysis of 
several other well-known protocols using this program is illustrated in Ap-
pendix B. The program is protocol-independent and generates all derivations 
of the complete set of formulae attained by the principals executing a given 
protocol. The proof explanation facility built into the program provides 
machine-generate proofs of any formula attained. In addition, the program 
enables automatic identification of redundant assumptions. The next chapter 
outlines the probabilistic BAN logic analysis proposed by Campbell, Safavi-
Naini and Pleasants in [4 . 
Chapter 4 
Probabilistic B A N Analysis 
This chapter discusses the application of probabilistic logic to BAN analysis 
of protocols. The use of the protocol analyzer program as an aid in carrying 
out probabilistic BAN analysis [4] is illustrated by means of the Needham-
Schroeder shared-key protocol. Finally, the misinterpretation in [3] of the 
significance of the probabilistic analysis of this protocol carried out in [4] is 
resolved. 
4.1 Introduction 
During protocol analysis, a conclusion derived may be implied by different 
assumptions or inference rules. For the purpose of determining whether a 
particular goal is achieved or not for the given set of assumptions, it suffices 
to ignore alternate derivations of the goal. However, the protocol analyzer 
generates all derivations of the inferred statements. This facilitates proba-
bilistic analysis, as discussed in the next section. 
4.2 Probabilistic Logic 
In the BAN model of reasoning about authentication protocols, principals 
are assumed to be totally committed to the logical statements describing 
their state. Specifically, the beliefs estabhshed during a protocol run are 
always considered to be true. In a hostile environment, however it may not 
be appropriate for the principals to assent fully to the initial assumptions 
and the inference rules of the logic. A probabilistic extension of BAN logic 
proposed by Campbell et al. [4] models insecurity by attaching probabilities 
to the statements and inference rules of the logic. The probability of the 
desired goal then gives a measure of the trust that can be put in the goal. 
The problem of determining the probability of a derived formula is shown 
in [7] to reduce to a linear programming problem and this reduction is out-
lined below. 
4.2.1 Probability of Derived Formula 
Let B = {6 i , . . . ,6m} be the set of assumptions and rule instances used in 
deriving a conclusion c. A possible world for the set B is any binary truth-
value assignment to the elements of B. Therefore, the number of possible 
worlds for B is Further, let pi be the probability of bi for 1 < z < m 
and let TTJ be the probability of the possible world Wj for 1 < j < 2"^. The 
individual TTJ sum to 1 since the possible worlds are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive. In the model proposed in [4], the probability pi of bi is taken to 
be the sum of the probabilities of the possible worlds in which bi is assigned 
a truth-value of 1. This can be rephrased mathematically by introducing 
matrix notation, as follows. 
Let the probabilities pi be arranged in a m-dimensional column matrix 
P = Similarly, let the probabilities TTJ be arranged in a 
dimensional column matrix tt = (tti, . . . ,7r2m). The element in the j t h row 
of TT is the probability of the j t h possible world Wj. Let W be the m x 
matrix {wij) such that Wij is the truth-value assigned to bi in the possible 
world Wj. Then, the probabilities of the assumptions and rule instances in B 
are related to the probabilities of the possible worlds by the matrix equation: 
P = W'K (4.1) 
Also,-
= l (4.2) i=i 
The probability of the conclusion c is given by: 
p{c) = qir (4.3) 
where q = {qj) is the -dimensional 0 — 1 row matrix such that qj = 1 if 
the 6¿'s which are assigned truth-value 1 in the possible world W}, form a 
minimal proof of c. 
To determine p(c), one therefore needs to compute the matrix tt by solving 
the set of simultaneous linear equations (4.1)-(4.2). In the general case, 
equation (4.1) is underdetermined and permits many solutions for tt, and 
hence one can only obtain bounds on the probability p{c). A lower bound L 
on p{c) can be obtained by solving the following linear programming problem: 
L = min(97r) 
subject to the constraints: 
W% = P 
i=i 
From the viewpoint of protocol security, the lower bound L, is significant 
since it is a measure of the minimum trust that can be put in the conclusion 
c. For the purpose of probabilistic analysis, it suffices to have one minimal 
proof from each equivalence class. As mentioned earlier in Section 3.3.2, 
the proof generator in the inference engine of our protocol analyzer program 
constructs one representative of each equivalence class of minimal proofs of 
the inferred statements for the given set of assumptions. 
4.2.2 Protocol Analysis 
Probabilistic analysis of protocols as proposed by Campbell et al. [4, 5] in-
volves calculating the minimum trust that can be placed in the goal of the 
protocol. It is carried out by determining all minimal proofs of the goal and 
then attaching probabilities to assumptions and rule instances used in the 
proofs. 
The operational meaning of attaching probabilities to statements and 
inference rules of the logic is given below, following [4]. 
The probability assigned to this statement reflects principal P's confi-
dence in the ability of P and Q to protect the key. 
• P N i ( ^ ) 
This statement is assigned a high probabihty when P can accept mes-
sages containing X as fresh. 
• P h X 
The probability assigned to this statement refers to P's confidence that 
no substitution has taken place in the message X sent by Q. 
• P^S^P^Q 
The probability assigned to this statement reflects P's confidence in 
the competence of S in generating good session keys. 
• P<iX 
The interpretation of this statement is that P sees the message X, and 
the statement is always assigned probability of 1. 
The probability attached to an instance of an inference rule reflects the 
confidence of the principal applying the inference rule that the particular 
inference holds: 
• Message-meaning rule 
p ^ g & p, p < { x } k 
p^qy^x 
The probability attached to an instance of this rule reflects the physi-
cal security of the communication channel between P and Q, and the 
resistance of the encryption algorithm used to encrypt X. 
• Nonce-verification rule 
p ^ P N Q h ^ 
PWQW^ 
The probability attached to an instance of this rule reflects the degree 
to which P trusts Q on the truth of X. 
Usually, instances of all inference rules except the message-meaning and 
nonce-verification inference rules are assumed to be certain, and are assigned 
a probability of 1. 
In probabilistic analysis, the problem is of determining the lower bound 
on the probability of the goal of the protocol knowing the probabilities of 
various assumptions and rule instances used in the minimal proofs of the 
goal. In principle, this lower bound can always be determined by solving a 
linear programming problem. However, the following two theorems given in 
4] show that when there are at most two minimal proofs of a conclusion, the 
lower bound on the probability of the conclusion can be directly expressed 
in terms of the probabilities of the assumptions and rule instances used in 
the minimal proofs. 
Let B = {61,. . . , 6m} be the set of assumptions and rule instances used 
in deriving a conclusion c, and let pi be the probability of fe¿ for 1 < z < m. 
Further, let J C {1 , . . . , m}. Define 
ieJ 
where | J \ denotes the number of elements in J. 
Theorem 4.1 Let there exist exactly one minimal proof of the conclusion 
c from B = and let J he the index set of this minimal proof. 
Then 
P(c )>max(0 , / ( J ) ) . 
Theorem 4.2 Let there exist exactly two minimal proofs of the conclusion c 
from B = {61,..., and let J and K he the index sets of the two minimal 
proofs. Then 
P(c )>max(0 , / ( J ) , / ( i i ) ) . 
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The above two theorems are proved in [7]. Moreover, the bounds given 
above are tight since in each case there is no other lower bound which is 
less than the one given above. In the general case, involving three or more 
minimal proofs the problem of obtaining a functional representation for the 
lower bound remains unsolved [4] and therefore an instance of a linear pro-
gramming problem needs to be solved to obtain this bound. 
4.3 The Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key Pr-
otocol 
Machine-aided BAN analysis of the Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key protocol 
was presented in Section 3.4. The use of the protocol analyzer in carrying 
out probabilistic analysis of this protocol follows. 
The idealized messages and the assumptions of this protocol are given 
below. 
Idealized Protocol: 
Message 2 S ^ 
Message 3 A 
Message 4 B ^ 
Message 5 A ^ 
Assumptions: 
A : {Na, A B, i{A "h' B), { A "h' B } K J K . 
A : {iV,, A 




A ^ S ^ A ^ B 
K 
K 
A N i W 
B) 
B ^ B ^ ' S 
S ^ B ^ ' S 
S ^ t{A B) 
B ^ S - ^ A ^ B 
B ^ B) 
B N i W 
As noted earlier in Section 3.4, the formula l[A ^ B) in the idealized 
Message 2 and the assumptions A ^ S => B) amd A S i{A 
B) are required for A to attain his second-order goal. Also, B needs to make 
the dubious assumption B ^ <4'' B) to attain his goal. The fact /3 facts 
defining the idealized protocol and the assumptions given above are stored 
in the file "nssk". 
4,3.1 Minimal Proofs 
The proofs of the goals attained by the principals are obtained by using the 
proof explanation facility. The only minimal proof of the first-order goal of 
B is: 
I ?- explain.proof(believesCb, goodkeyCkab, a, b))). 
1. sends(a,b,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {Step} 
2. believesCb,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
3. sees(b,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {1, Seeing} 
4. believesCb,goodkey(kbs,s,b)) {2, BidirectioneLlity} 
5. believesCb,oncesaidCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {4, 3, Message meaning} 
6. believesCb,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b))) {Assumption} 
7. believesCb,believesCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {6, 5, lonce verification} 
8. believesCb,jurisdictionCs,goodkeyC_1258748,a,b))) {Assumption} 
9. believesCb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)) {8, 7, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
If the redundant assumption B ^ ) is made, then the second-order 
goal of B has three minimal proofs which are given in Appendix B.2. Dis-
carding this assumption results in two minimal proofs of this goal: 
1. sendsCa,b,encryptCkab, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sendsCa,b,encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {Step} 
3. believesCb,goodkeyCkbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. seesCb,encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {2, Seeing} 
5. believesCb,goodkeyCkbs,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believesCb,oncesaidCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {5, 4, Message mesming} 
7. believesCb,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b))) {Assumption} 
8. believesCb,believesCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {7, 6, lonce verification} 
9. believesCb,jurisdictionCs,goodkeyC_1259896,a,b))) {Assumption} 
10. seesCb.encryptCkab, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
11. believesCb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)) {9, 8, Jurisdiction} 
12. believesCb,oncesaidCa, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {11, 10, Message meaning} 
13. believesCb,freshC[nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {7, Freshness} 
14. believesCb,believesCa,[nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {13, 12, lonce verification} 
15. believesCb,believesCa,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {14, Belief} 
1. sendsCa,b,encryptCkab, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sends Ca,b, encrypt Ckbs, goodkey Ckab, a, b))) {Step} 
3. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees(b,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {2, Seeing} 
5. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(b,oncesaid(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
7. believes(b,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b))) {Assumption} 
8. believes(b,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {7, 6, lonce verification} 
9. believes(b,jurisdict ion(s,goodkey(_1259764,a,b))) {Assumpt ion} 
10. sees(b,encrypt(kab,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
11. believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {9, 8, Jurisdiction} 
12. believes(b,oncesaid(a,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {11, 10, Message meaning} 
13. believes(b,oncesaid(a,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {12, Utterance} 
14. believes(b,believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {7, 13, lonce verification} 
yes 
It can be seen from the above output that both the proofs are identical till 
Step no.l2 in which the belief {Nb, A ^ B) is established. In the 
first minimal proof, B applies the nonce-verification rule without splitting 
K, {Nb,A B) to obtain the composite belief B ^ A ^ {Ni,A B). 
This composite belief is then finally split to obtain the desired second-order 
goal. On the other hand, B can also first split {Nb,A ^ B) to obtain 
B ^ A ^ B and then finally use the nonce-verification rule to derive 
his second-order goal. This alternative corresponds to the second minimal 
proof. Note that in both these proofs, B uses the dubious assumption while 
applying the nonce-verification rule. 
4.3.2 Lower Bounds 
Once all the minimal proofs of the goals attained by A and B are ascertained, 
probabilistic analysis can be carried out. The derivation of the lower bounds 
on the probabilities of the goals attained by principal B is given below. 
Let ci and C2 denote the first-order and second-order goals of principal B 
respectively: 
ci : B^A^' B 
C2: B^A^A^'B 
By inspecting the minimal proofs of the goals of principal it can be seen 
that the following statements and rule instances are used in the derivation 
of ci and C2. 
Assumptions: 
ai: B^B^' S 
as: B^iiA'h'B) 
as: B^S A^ B 
The redundant assumption «4 : B ^ |J(7Vfe) is discarded. 
Messages: 


















B N iW 
B^B^' S 
BWS^' B 
Let pi, P25 Ps denote the probabilities attached to the assumptions «i, a2, 
03. Both mi and m2 are assigned a probability of 1. The rule instances rs, 
r j , rg, rg are certain, i.e., have probabihty 1. Let the rule instances r i , 
rs be assigned probabilities ps, Pe, P?, Ps-
The set of logical statements and rule instances used in the only minimal 
proof of ci is {mi, ai , «2, «3, n , Since there exists only one minimal 
proof of ci, the lower bound on p{ci) is obtained by applying Theorem 4.1, 
as: 
p(ci) > m a x ( 0 , l + p i + p 2 + P 3 + P 5 + P 6 + l + l - 8 + l) 
> max(0,pi + P2 + + P5 + P6 - 4) 
For C2, the two sets of assumptions and rule instances used in the minimal 
proofs are: 
• {mi, 7712, «1, «2, «3, ri, r2, rs, r4, rg, rg, rg, rg} 
• {mi, m2, «1, «2, «3, n , r2, rs, r4, rg, ry, rg} 
By applying Theorem 4.2, the lower bound on P(C2) is obtained as: 
P{C2) > 
max(0,1 + 1 + Pi + P2 + P3 + + P6 + 1 + P7 + + 1 + 1 + 1 - 13 + 1, 
1 + 1 + Pi + P2 + P3 + P5 + P6 + 1 + P7 + P8 + 1 + 1 - 12 + 1) 
> max(0. Pi + P2 + P3 + P5 + + + Ps - 6) 
From the lower bounds on p(ci) and p(c2) obtained above, it can be seen 
that each of the p^'s occurring in the expression for a bound play an equal 
role in determining the value of the bound. Recall that each such pi is the 
probability of an assumption or an inference rule used in deriving the goals 
of principal B. Also, each pi G [0,1 . 
4.3.3 Interpreting the Bounds 
In [4] it is stated that: 
If we consider the probabilities of the conclusions above we see 
that p(ci) and p(c2) ^ 0 as p2 —0, i.e., the lower bound on 
the probability of the conclusion tends to zero, as the trust in a2 
tends to zero." 
The significance of this result has been seriously misinterpreted in [3 
where it is claimed on the basis of the above result that: 
'The weakness of the Needham and Schroeder protocol was dis-
covered by the extensions of Campbell et al., as the original BAN 
logic does without using prior knowledge of it. 
While it is certainly true that BAN logic analysis is successful in detecting 
the flaw in this protocol without prior knowledge of it, it is misleading to 
attribute the same virtue to the probabilistic analysis of Campbell et al. 
Although, p{ci) and p{c2) ^ 0 as —> 0, so do they even when any other 
Pi 0. This cannot imply that the corresponding ai is responsible for the 
weakness in the protocol. 
Chapter 5 
Conclusions 
The main objective of this project was to develop an implementation of 
the BAN logic, and to demonstrate its use in carrying out analysis of au-
thentication protocols. A Prolog program for this task has been developed, 
and has been applied to several well-known protocols as illustrated in Ap-
pendix B. The program generates all derivations of the formulae attained by 
the principals executing the protocol. This allows identification of redundant 
assurnptions and also facilitates probabilistic analysis of protocols. 
The implementation of the inference rules of the logic in the program 
is independent of any specific protocol. The protocol-independent inference 
engine enhances its applicability as a general purpose tool, unlike the pro-
grams proposed in [5, 6]. The program has proved effective in mechanically 
verifying the analysis of several well-known protocols, published in [1]. It 
helped detect a missing assumption in the analysis of the Kerberos protocol 
B.3] and pinpoint a mistake in the idealization of the Needham-Schroeder 
public-key protocol [B.5], given in [1]. 
The applicability of the program in verifying protocols is determined by 
the scope of BAN logic [1] itself, which is briefly discussed below. 
5.1 Scope 
The BAN logic does not attempt to capture the problems arising out of in-
appropriate uses of cryptosystems. For example, there is no rule for checking 
whether a particular key is long enough or not. Although the logic allows for 
the possibility of hostile intruders, it assumes that the principals executing 
the protocol are trustworthy. In particular, it does not deal with unautho-
rized release of secrets. Also, it does not attempt to capture weaknesses of 
encryption schemes. Specifically, the following assumptions about encryption 
underlie the rules of the logic: 
• Encryption is perfect; i.e., it is computationally infeasible to decipher 
an encrypted message without knowing the appropriate key(s) and to 
determine these key(s) from a combination of ciphertext and plaintext. 
Further, each encrypted unit is integral. For example, it is assumed 
that it is infeasible to fabricate { S ^ T } k from { 5 , 
and {V,T} /c , without knowing K. 
• A principal deciphering an encrypted message would be able to deter-
mine whether the right decryption key has been used to recover the 
message. This requirement is based on the assumption that the plain-
text recovered may not be completely unpredictable to the recipient. 
• A principal can recognize his own messages. In practice, this is achieved 
by including direction bits in messages, to identify the sender and the 
• intended recipient of a message. 
Moreover, the logic does not distinguish between the different purposes 
underlying the use of encryption in protocols. It does not capture distinctions 
arising out of the use of encryption to preserve secrecy, to maintain integrity 
of a message, or to demonstrate the knowledge of a key. Nonetheless, the 
logic has proved effective in pointing out flaws and redundancies in several 
protocols [1]. 
The protocol analyzer program based on the logic serves as a useful tool 
in the analysis of authentication protocols. It also provides a basic framework 
for implementing the extensions of BAN logic proposed in [9, 8 . 
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Appendix B 
Examples of Machine-aided 
BAN Analysis 
B.l The Otway-Rees Protocol 
Message 1 A ^ B : M,A,B,{Na,M,A,B}Kas 
Message 2 BS : M, A, M, A, {iVt, M, A, 
Messages S ^ B : M, {AT̂ , î t̂ka., ^a^K, 
Message 4 B ^ A : M,{Na,Kab}Kas 
B.1.1 Program Representation 
y. The Otway-Rees Protocol 
y. Idealized Protocol 
factCl, sendsCa, b, encrypt(kas, [na, nc])), reason([], 'Step')), 
fact(2, sends(b, s, [encrypt(kas, [na, nc]), encrypt(kbs, [nb, nc])]), 
reason([], 'Step')). 
fact(3, sends(s, b, [encrypt(kas, [na, goodkey(kab, a, b), oncesaid(b, nc)]), 
encryptCkbs, [nb, goodkey(kab, a, b), oncesaidia, nc)])]), reason([], 'Step')). 
fact(4, sendsCb, a, encrypt(kas, [na, goodkey(kab, a, b), oncesaid(b, nc)])), 
reason([], 'Step')). 
y. Assumptions 
fact(S, believes(a, goodkey(kas, a, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(6, believes(a, jurisdiction(s, goodkey(_, a, b))),reason(•,'Assumption')). 
fact(7, believesCa, jurisdiction(s, oncesaidCb, _))), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(8, believesCa, fresh(na)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
f a c t O , believes(a, fresh(nc)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
f a c t d O , believes(b, goodkey(kbs, b, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
f a c t d l , believesCb, jurisdiction(s,goodkey(_, a, b))) .reasonCD ,'Assumption')) . 
fact(12, believesCb, jurisdictionCs, oncesaidCa, _))), reason([],'Assumption')). 
fact(13, believesCb, fresh(nb)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(14, believesCs, goodkeyCkas, a, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(15, believes(s, goodkey(kbs, b, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')), 
fact(16, believe8(s, goodkey(kab, a, b)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
B.1,2 Proofs 
I ?- analyze(or). 
Analyzed in 4 cycles 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(a, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
1. sends(b,a,encrypt(kas, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)])) {Step} 
2. believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
3. sees(a,encrypt(kas, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)])) {1, Seeing} 
4. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {2, Bidirectionality} 
5. believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
6. believes(a,oncesaid(s, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)])) {4, 3, Message meaning} 
7. believes(a,fresh([na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)])) {5, Freshness} 
8. believes(a,believes(s, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)])) {7, 6, lonce verification} 
9. believes(a,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {8, Belief} 
10. believes(a,jurisdiction(s,goodkey(.1259444,a,b))) {Assumption} 
11. believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {10, 9, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(a, believes(b, nc))). 
1. sends(b,a,encrypt(kas,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b),oncesaid(b,nc)])) {Step} 
2. belaeves(a,goodkey(k€is,a,s)) {Assumption} 
3. sees(a,encrypt(kas, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)])) {1, Seeing} 
4. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {2, Bidirectionality} 
5. believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
6. believes(a,oncesaid(s, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)])) {4, 3, Message meaning} 
7. believes(a,fresh([na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)] )) {5, Freshness} 
8. believes(a,believes(s, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)])) {7, 6, Vonce verification} 
9. believes(a,believes(s,oncesaid(b,nc))) {8, Belief} 
10. believes(a,jurisdiction(s,oncesaid(b,.1259604))) {Assumption} 
11. believes(a,oncesaid(b,nc)) {10, 9, Jurisdiction} 
12. believes(a,fresh(nc)) {Assumption} 
13. believes(a,believes(b,nc)) {12, 11, lonce verification} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(b, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
1. sends(s,b, [encrypt(kas, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)]),encrypt(kbs, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) , 
oncesaid(a,nc)])]) {Step} 
2. sees (b, [encrypt (kas, [na .goodkey (kab, a ,b) ,oncesaid(b ,nc)] ) , encrypt (kbs, [nb,goodkey (kab, a ,b) , 
oncesaid(a,nc)])]) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees(b,encrypt(kbs, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(a,nc)])) {2, Sight} 
5. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(b,fresh(nb)) {Assumption} 
7. believes(b,oncesaid(8, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(a,nc)])) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believes(b,fresh([nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(a,nc)])) {6, Freshness} 
9. believes(b,believes(s, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(a,nc)])) {8, 7, lonce verification} 
10. believes(b,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(b,jurisdiction(s.goodkey(.1260024,a,b))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believesCb, oncesaidCa, nc))). 
1. sends(s,b,[encrypt(kas, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(b,nc)]),encrypt(kbs, Cnb,goodkey(kab,a,b) 
oncesaidCa,nc)])]) {Step} 
2. sees(b, [encrypt(kas,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b),oncesaid(b,nc)]),encrypt(kbs,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) , 
oncesaid(a,nc)])]) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees(b,encrypt(kbs,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b),oncesaid(a,nc)])) {2, Sight} 
5. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(b,fresh(nb)) {Assumption} 
7. believes(b,oncesaid(s, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(a,nc)])) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believes(b,fresh([nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(a,nc)] )) {6, Freshness} 
9. believes(b,believes(s, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,oncesaid(a,nc)])) {8, 7, lonce verification} 
10. believes(b,believes(s,oncesaid(a,nc))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(b,jurisdiction(s,oncesaid(a,_1259964))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(b,oncesaid(a,nc)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
I ?- [user]. 
[Compiling user] 
goal(believes(a, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(a, believes(b, nc))). 
goal(believes(b, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(b, oncesaid(a, nc))). 
[user compiled, cpu time used: 0.86101 seconds] 
[user loaded] 
yes 
I ?- chk_red(a. A, As), 
no 
I ?- chk_red(b, A, As). 
B.2 The Needham-Schroeder Shared-Key Pro-
tocol 
Message 1 A 5 : A,B,Na 
Message 2 A: B, {̂ «6, 
Messages AB : {Kab,A}K,, 
Message 4 BA : {Nb}Kab 
Messages A ^ B : {iVt -
B.2.1 Program Representation 
y. The leedham-Schroeder Shared-Key Protocol 
y. Idealized protocol 
f a c t d , sendsCs, a, encryptCkas, [na, goodkey(kab, a, b), fresh(goodkey(kab, a, b)), 
encrypt(kbs, goodkeyCkab, a, b))])), reason([], 'Step')). 
fact(2, sends(a, b, encryptCkbs, goodkey(kab, a, b))), reason([], 'Step')). 
fact(3, sends(b, a, encryptCkab, [nb, goodkeyCkab, a, b)])), reason([], 'Step')). 
fact(4, sendsCa, b, encryptCkab, [nb, goodkeyCkab, a, b)])), reasonC[], 'Step')). 
y. Assumptions 
factCS, believesCa, goodkeyCkas, a, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCS, believesCa, jurisdictionCs, goodkeyC., a, b))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factC7, believesCa, jurisdictionCs, freshCgoodkeyC., a, b)))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCS, believesCa, freshCna)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factC9, believesCb, goodkeyCkbs, b, s)), reasonCC]» 'Assumption')). 
factClO, believesCb, jurisdictionCs, goodkeyC., a, b))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCll, believesCb, freshCnb)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCl2, believesCb, freshCgoodkeyCkab, a, b))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCl3, believesCs, goodkeyCkas, a, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCl4, believesCs, goodkeyCkbs, b, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factClS, believesCs, goodkeyCkab, a, b)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCie, believesCs, freshCgoodkeyCkab, a, b))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
B.2,2 Proofs 
I ?- analyzeCnssk). 
Analyzed in 6 cycles 
yes 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCa, believesCb, goodkeyCkab, a, b)))). 
1. sendsCb,a,encryptCkab,[nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sends Cs, a,encrypt Ckas, Cna,goodkeyCkab,a, b),freshCgoodkeyCkab, a,b)) 
encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))])) {Step} 
3. believesCa,goodkeyCkas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees (a,encrypt(kas,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b),fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)), 
encrypl;(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) {2, Seeing} 
5. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
7. believes (a, oncesaidCs, [na,goodkey(kab, a, b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)), encrypt (kbs,goodkey(kab, a, b))])) 
{5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believes (a,fresh([na,goodkey(kab, a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,encrypt(kbs ,goodkey(kab,a,b))] )) 
{6, Freshness} 
9. believes(a,believes(s, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) 
{8, 7, lonce verification} 
10. believes(a,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {9, Belief} 
11. believesCa,jurisdiction(s,goodkey(_1262876,a,b))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
13. sees(a,encrypt(kab, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
14. believes(a,goodkey(kab,b,a)) {12, Bidirectionality} 
15. believes(a,believes(s,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)))) {9, Belief} 
16. believes(a,jurisdiction(s,fresh(goodkey(.1263184,a,b)))) {Assumption} 
17. believes(a,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b))) {16, 15, Jurisdiction} 
18. believes(a,oncesaid(b, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {14, 13, Message meaning} 
19. believes(a,fresh([nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {17, Freshness} 
20. believes(a,believes(b,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {19, 18, lonce verification} 
21. believes(a,believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {20, Belief} 
1. sends(b,a,encrypt(kab,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sends(s,a,encrypt(kas, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)),encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) 
{Step} 
3. believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees (a,encrypt(kas,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b),fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)),encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab ,a,b))])) 
{2, Seeing} 
5. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
7. believes(a,oncesaid(s, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) 
{5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believes (a,fresh([na,goodkey (kab, a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) , encrypt (kbs,goodkey (kab, a,b))])) 
{6, Freshness} 
9. believes(a,believes(s, [na, goodkey (kab, a, b) ,f resh (goodkey (kab, a,b)) , encrypt (kbs ,goodkey (kab ,a,b))])) 
{8, 7, lonce verification} 
10. believes(a,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(a,jurisdiction(8,goodkey(.1262584,a,b))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
13. sees(a,encrypt(kab, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
14. believes(a,goodkey(kab,b,a)) {12, Bidirectionality} 
15. believes(a,oncesaid(b, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {14, 13, Message meaning} 
16. believes(a,believes(s,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)))) {9, Belief} 
17. believes(a,jurisdiction(s,fresh(goodkey(_1262976,a,b)))) {Assumption} 
18. beiieves(a,oncesaid(b,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {15, Utterance} 
19. believes(a,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b))) {17, 16, Jurisdiction} 
20. believes(a,believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {19, 18, lonce verification} 
1. sends(b,a,encrypt(kab,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sends (s,a,encrypt(kas,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b),fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)),encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) 
{Step} 
3. believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees (a, encrypt (kas, [na, goodkey (kab, a, b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) .encrypt (kbs, goodkey (kab,a,b))])) 
{2, Seeing} 
5. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes (a, oncesaid(s, [na, goodkey (kab, a, b> ,fresh(goodkey (kab, a,b)), encrypt (kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) 
{5, 4, Message meaning} 
7. believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
8. believes (a,fresh([na,goodkey (kab, a,b) ,f resh (goodkey (kab, a,b)), encrypt (kbs,goodkey (kab, a,b))])) 
{7, Freshness} 
9. believes (a, believes (s, [na, goodkey (kab, a, b) , fresh (goodkey (kab, a,b)) , encrypt (kbs,goodkey (kab,a,b) )])) 
{8, 6, lonce verification} 
10. believes(a,believes(s,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(a,jurisdiction(s,fresh(goodkey(_1264392,a,b)))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(a,oncesaid(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {6, Utterance} 
13. believes(a,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b))) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
14. believes(a,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {13, 12, lonce verification} 
15. believes (a, jurisdiction(s ,goodkey (.1264636, a,b))) {Assumption} 
16. believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {15, 14, Jurisdiction} 
17. sees(a,encrypt(kab,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
18. believes(a,goodkey(kab,b,a)) {16, Bidirectionality} 
19. believes(a,oncesaid(b, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {18, 17, Message meaning} 
20. believes(a,fresh([nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {13, Freshness} 
21. believes(a,believes(b, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {20, 19, lonce verification} 
22. believes(a,believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {21, Belief} 
1. sends(b,a,encrypt(kab, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sends (s, a, encrypt (kas, [na, goodkey (kab, a, b), fresh (goodkey (kab, a ,b)) , encrypt (kbs, goodkey (kab, a, b)) ])) 
{Step} 
3. believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,8)) {Assumption} 
4. sees(a,encrypt(kas, [na,goodkey(kab,a,b),fresh(goodkey (kab,a,b) ), encrypt (kbs .goodkey (kab, a, b))])) 
{2, Seeing} 
5. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes (a, oncesaid(s,[na,goodkey (kab,a,b),fresh (goodkey (kab, a,b)) .encrypt (kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) 
{5, 4. Message meaning} 
7. believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
8. believes(a,fresh([na.goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a.b))] )) 
{7. Freshness} 
9. believes(a,believes(s,[na,goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))])) 
{8, 6, lonce verification} 
10. believes(a,believes(s,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(a,jurisdiction(s,fresh(goodkey(.1264100,a,b)))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(a,oncesaid(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {6, Utterance} 
13. believes(a,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b))) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
14. believes(a,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {13, 12, lonce verification} 
15. believes(a.jurisdiction(s .goodkey(.1264344,a,b))) {Assumption} 
16. believes(a,goodkey(kab.a.b)) {15. 14. Jurisdiction} 
17. sees(a,encrypt(kab.[nb.goodkey(kab.a.b)])) {1, Seeing} 
18. believes(a,goodkey(kab.b.a)) {16. Bidirectionality} 
19. believes(a,oncesaid(b, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {18, 17, Message meaning} 
20. believes(a,oncesaid(b,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {19, Utterance} 
21. believes(a,believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {13, 20, lonce verification} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(b, believes(a, goodkey(kab, a, b)))). 
1. sends(a,b,encrypt(kab,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sends(a,b,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {Step} 
3. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees(b,encrypt(kbs,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {2, Seeing} 
5. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(b,oncesaid(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
7. believes(b,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b))) {Assumption} 
8. believes(b,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {7, 6, lonce verification} 
9. believes(b,jurisdiction(s,goodkey(.1259896,a,b))) {Assumption} 
10. sees(b,encrypt(kab, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
11. beiieves(b,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {9, 8, Jurisdiction} 
12. believesCb,fresh(nb)) {Assumption} 
13. believesCb,oncesaid(a, [nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {11, 10, Message meaning} 
14. believesCb,fresh([nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)] )) {12, Freshness} 
15. believesCb,believesCa,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {14, 13, lonce verification} 
16. believesCb,believesCa,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {15, Belief} 
1. sendsCa,b,encryptCkab, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)] )) {Step} 
2. sendsCa,b,encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {Step} 
3. believesCb,goodkeyCkbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. seesCb,encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {2, Seeing} 
5. believesCb,goodkeyCkbs,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believesCb,oncesaidCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
7. believesCb,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b))) {Assumption} 
8. believesCb,believesCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {7, 6, lonce verification} 
9. believesCb,jurisdictionCs,goodkeyC_1259896,a,b))) {Assumption} 
10. seesCb,encryptCkab,[nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
11. believesCb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)) {9, 8, Jurisdiction} 
12. believesCb,oncesaidCa, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {11, 10, Message meaning} 
13. believesCb,freshCCnb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {7, Freshness} 
14. believesCb,believesCa, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {13, 12, lonce verification} 
15. believesCb,believesCa,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {14, Belief} 
1. sendsCa,b,encryptCkab, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sendsCa,b,encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {Step} 
3. believesCb,goodkeyCkbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. seesCb,encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {2, Seeing} 
5. believesCb,goodkeyCkbs,8,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believesCb,oncesaidCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
7. believesCb,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b))) {Assumption} 
8. believesCb,believesCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {7, 6, lonce verification} 
9. believesCb,jurisdictionCs,goodkeyC_1259764,a,b))) {Assumption} 
10. see8Cb,encryptCkab,[nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
11. believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {9, 8, Jurisdiction} 
12. believes(b,oncesaid(a,[nb,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {11, 10, Message meaning} 
13. believes(b,oncesaid(a,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {12, Utterance} 
14. believes(b,believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {7, 13, lonce verification} 
yes 
I ?- [user]. 
[Compiling user] 
goal(believes(a, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(a, believes(b, goodkeyCkab, a, b)))). 
goal(believes(b, goodkeyCkab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(b, believesCa, goodkeyCkab, a, b)))). 
[user compiled, cpu time used: 0.29102 seconds] 
[user loaded] 
yes 
I ?- chk_red(a. A, As), 
no 
I ?- chk.redCb, A, As). 
A = believes(b,fresh(nb)) 
As = [believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) ,believes(b,jurisdiction(s,goodkey(.1257384,a,b))) 
believes(b,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)))] ; 
B.3 The Kerberos Protocol 
Message 1 A^ S : A,B 
Message 2 5 A : {Ts,L,Kah,B,{Ts,L,Kah,A]KjKas 
Messages A ^ B : {Ts,L,Kab,A}K,,,{A,Ta}Kat 
Message 4 B ^ A : {T« + 
B.3.1 Program Representation 
% The Kerberos Protocol 
•/, Idealized Protocol 
f a c t d , sendsCs, a, encryptCkas, [ts, goodkeyCkab, a, b), encryptCkbs, [ts, goodkeyCkab,a, b)])])), 
reasonC[], 'Step')). 
factC2, sendsCa, b, [encryptCkbs, [ts, goodkeyCkab, a, b)]), encryptCkab, [ta, goodkeyCkab, a, b)])]), 
reasonC[], 'Step')). factC3, sendsCb, a, encryptCkab, [ta, goodkeyCkab, a, b)])), reasonC[], 'Step')). 
% Assunptions 
fact(4, believesCa, goodkeyCkas, a, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(5, believes(a, jurisdiction(s, goodkey(_, a, b))), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(6, believesCa, fresh(ts)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
% This assumption is missing in the «malysis given in [1] 
fact(7, believesCa, freshCta)), reason(C], 'Assumption')). 
fact(8, believesCb, goodkey(kbs, b, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
f a c t O , believesCb, jurisdictionCs, goodkey(_, a, b))), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
factCiO, believesCb, freshCts)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCll, believesCb, freshCta)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCl2, believesCs, goodkeyCkas, a, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCl3, believesCs, goodkeyCkbs, b, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
facte14, believesCs, goodkeyCkab, a, b)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
B.3.2 Proofs 
I ?- euialyzeCkerberos). 
Analyzed in 6 cycles 
yes 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCa, goodkeyCkab, a, b))). 
1. sendsCs,a,encryptCkas, Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b) ,encryptCkbs, Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b)] )] )) {Step} 
2. believesCa,goodkeyCkas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
3. seesCa,encryptCkas,Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b) ,encryptCkbs,Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])])) {1, Seeing} 
4. believesCa,goodkeyCkas,s,a)) {2, Bidirectionality} 
5. believesCa,freshCts)) {Assumption} 
6. believesCa,oncesaidCs,Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b),encryptCkbs,Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])])) 
{4, 3, Message meaning} 
7. believesCa,freshCCts,goodkeyCkab,a,b) ,encryptCkbs,Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])])) {5, Freshness} 
8. believesCa,believesCs,Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b),encryptCkbs,Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])])) { 
7, 6, lonce verification} 
9. believesCa,believesCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {8, Belief} 
10. believesCa,jurisdictionCs ,goodkeyC_1259764 ,a,b))) {Assumption} 
11. believesCa,goodkeyCkab,a,b)) {10, 9, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
The need for the assumption A ^ ((^a) is highlighted by the following proof 
of the second-order goal of A: 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCa, believesCb, goodkeyCkab, a, b)))). 
1. sendsCb,a,encryptCkab.Cta,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])) {Step} 
2. sendsCs,a,encrypt Ckas, Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b) .encrypt Ckbs, Cts,goodkeyCkab, a,b)])])) {Step} 
3. believesCa,goodkeyCkas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
4. seesCa,encryptCkas, Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b) ,encryptCkbs, Cts,goodkeyCkab,a,b)])])) {2, Seeing} 
5. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(a,fresh(ts)) {Assumption} 
7. believes (a,oncesaid(s,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b),encrypt(kbs,[t s,goodkey(kab,a,b)])])) 
{5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believes(a,fresh([ts,goodkey(kab,a,b),encrypt(kbs,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])])) {6, Freshness} 
9. believes (a, believes (s, [ts, goodkey (kab, a,b) , encrypt (kbs, [ts, goodkey (kab, a, b)] )])) 
{8, 7, lonce verification} 
10. believes(a,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(a,jurisdiction(s,goodkey(.1261140,a,b))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
13. sees(a,encrypt(kab, [ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {1, Seeing} 
14. believes(a,goodkey(kab,b,a)) {12, Bidirectionality} 
15. believes(a,fresh(ta)) {Assumption} 
16. believes(a,oncesaid(b, [ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {14, 13, Message meaning} 
17. believes(a,fresh([ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {15, Freshness} 
18. believes(a,believes(b, [ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {17, 16, lonce verification} 
19. believes(a,believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {18, Belief} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(b, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
1. sends(a,b,[encrypt(kbs,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)]),encrypt(kab,[ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])]) {Step} 
2. sees(b,[encrypt(kbs,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)]) ,encrypt(kab,[ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])]) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees (b, encrypt (kbs, [ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {2, Sight} 
5. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(b,fresh(ts)) {Assumption} 
7. believes(b,oncesaid(s,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believes(b,fresh([ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {6, Freshness} 
9. believes(b,believes(s,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {8, 7, lonce verification} 
10. believes(b,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(b,jurisdiction(s,goodkey(.1259704,a,b))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(b, believes(a, goodkey(kab, a, b)))). 
1. sends(a,b,[encrypt(kbs,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)]),encrypt(kab,[ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])]) {Step} 
2. sees(b,[encrypt(kbs,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)]),encrypt(kab,[ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])]) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(b,goodkey(kbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees(b,encrypt(kbs,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {2, Sight} 
5. believes(b,goodkey(kb8,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believes(b,fresh(ts)) {Assumption} 
7. believes(b,oncesaid(8,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believes(b,fresh([ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {6, Freshness} 
9. believes(b,believes(s,[ts,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {8, 7, lonce verification} 
10. believe8(b,believes(s,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(b,jurisdiction(s,goodkey(.1261076,a,b))) {Assumption} 
12. sees(b,encrypt(kab,[ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {2, Sight} 
13. believes(b,goodkey(kab,a,b)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
14. believes(b,fresh(ta)) {Assumption} 
15. believes(b,oncesaid(a, [ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {13, 12, Message meaning} 
16. believes(b,fresh([ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {14, Freshness} 
17. believes(b,believes(a, [ta,goodkey(kab,a,b)])) {16, 15, lonce verification} 
18. believes(b,believes(a,goodkey(kab,a,b))) {17, Belief} 
yes 
I ?- [user]. 
[Compiling user] 
goal(believes(a, goodkeyCkab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(a, believesCb, goodkeyCkab, a, b)))) 
goal(believes(b, goodkeyCkab, a, b))). 
goalCbelievesCb, believesCa, goodkeyCkab, a, b)))) 
[user compiled, cpu time used: 0.311 seconds] 
[user loaded] 
yes 
I ?- chk.redCa, A , As), 
no 
I ?- chk.redCb, A, As). 
B.4 The Yahalom Protocol 
Message 1 AB : A,Na 
Message 2 B S : B,{A,Na, Nb}K,s 
Message 3 S A: {B, Kab, Na, iVtlx«,, {A, Kab}K,, 
Message 4 A ̂  B \ {A, î afcl/Ct,, {^b}Kab 
BAA Program Representation 
factCl, sendsCb, s, encryptCkbs, [na, nb])), reasonC[], 'Step')). 
factC2, sendsCs, a, [encryptCkas, [goodkeyCkab, a, b), freshCgoodkeyCkab, a, b)) 
, na, nb, oncesaidCb, na)]), encryptCkbs, goodkeyCkab, a, b))]), reasonC[], 'Ste 
p')). 
factC3, sendsCa, b , [encryptCkbs, goodkeyCkab, a, b)), encryptCkab, combinedCnb, 
[nb, goodkeyCkab, a, b), believesCs, freshCgoodkeyCkab, a, b)))]))]), reasonC[], 
' S t e p ' ) ) , 
y. A s s u m p t i o n s 
factC4, believesCa, goodkeyCkas, a, s)), reasonC[], 'Assumption')). 
factCS, believesCa, jurisdictionCs, goodkeyC., a, b))), reasonC[], 'Assumption') 
). 
fact(6, believes(a, fresh(na)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(7, believes(a, jurisdiction(s, oncesaidCb, _))), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(8, believesCb, goodkeyCkbs, b, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
f a c t O , believesCb, jurisdiction(s, goodkey(_, a, b))), reason([], 'Assumption') 
). 
fact(10, believes(b, fresh(nb)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
f a c t d l , believesCb, jurisdictionCs, fresh(goodkey(_, a, b)))), reason([], 'Assu 
mption')). 
fact(12, believesCb, jurisdictionCa, believesCs, fresh(goodkey(_, a, b))))), 
reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(13, believesCb, secretCnb, a, b)), reasonC[], 'Assumption')). 
factCl4, believesCs, goodkeyCkas, a, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factClS, believesCs, goodkeyCkbs, b, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCl6, believesCs, goodkeyCkab, a, b)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCl7, believesCs, freshCgoodkeyCkab, a, b))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
B.4.2 Proofs 
I ?- analyzeCyahalom). 
Analyzed in 7 cycles 
yes 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCa, goodkeyCkab, a, b))). 
1. sendsCs, a, Cencrypt Ckas, Cgoodkey Ckab, a ,b) ,f reshCgoodkey Ckab,a,b)),na,nb, oncesaidCb,na)] ) , 
encrypt Ckbs,goodkey Ckab,a,b))]) {Step} 
2. seesCa, CencryptCkas, CgoodkeyCkab,a,b) ,fresh Cgoodkey Ckab, a,b)) , na,nb, oncesaid Cb, na) ]), 
encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))]) {1, Seeing} 
3. believesCa,goodkeyCkas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
4. sees C a, encrypt Ckas, Cgoodkey Ckab, a, b) ,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)) ,na,nb,oncesaidCb,na)] )) 
{2, Sight} 
5. believesCa,goodkeyCkas,s,a)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. believesCa,freshCna)) {Assumption} 
7. believesCa,oncesaidCs,CgoodkeyCkab,a,b),freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)),na,nb,oncesaidCb,na)])) 
{5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believes Ca, f reshC Cgoodkey Ckab, a ,b) ,f resh Cgoodkey Ckab, a ,b)), na, nb, oncesaid Cb, na) ])) 
{6, Freshness} 
9. believes Ca,believesCs, CgoodkeyCkab,a,b),freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)) ,na,nb,oncesaidCb,na)] )) 
{8, 7 , lonce verification} 
10. believesCa,believesCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {9, Belief} 
11. believesCa,jurisdictionCs,goodkeyC_1260360,a,b))) {Assumption} 
12. believesCa,goodkeyCkab,a,b)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCa, believesCb, na))). 
1. sends Cs, a, Cencrypt Ckas, Cgoodkey Ckab, a ,b) ,f reshCgoodkey Ckab, a, b) ) , na, nb, oncesaid Cb, na) ]) 
encrypt Ckbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))] ) {Step} 
2. seesCa, CencryptCkas,CgoodkeyCkab,a,b),freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)),na,nb,oncesaidCb,na)]), 
encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))]) {1, Seeing} 
3 . believes(a,goodkey(kas,a,s)) {Assumption} 
4 . sees(a,encrypt(kas, [goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,na,nb,oncesaid(b,na)] )) 
{2, Sight} 
5. believes(a,goodkey(kas,s,a)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6 . believes(a,fresh(na)) {Assumption} 
7 . believes(a,oncesaid(s, [goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,na,nb,oncesaid(b,na)] )) 
{5, 4 , Message meaning} 
8 . believes(a,fresh([goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,na,nb,oncesaid(b,na)])) 
{6, Freshness} 
9 . believes(a,believes(s, [goodkey(kab,a,b) ,fresh(goodkey(kab,a,b)) ,na,nb,oncesaid(b,na)] )) 
{8, 7 , lonce verification} 
10. believes(a,believes(s,oncesaid(b,na))) {9, Belief} 
11. believes(a,jurisdiction(s,oncesaid(b,.1260512))) {Assumption} 
12. believes(a,oncesaid(b,na)) {11, 10, Jurisdiction} 
13. believes(a,believes(b,na)) {6, 12, lonce verification} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(b, goodkeyCkab, a, b))). 
1. sends (a, b , [encrypt (kbs, goodkeyCkab, a, b)) ,encrypt (kab, combined (nb, [nb,goodkeyCkab, a, b) , 
believes Cs,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)))]))]) {Step} 
2. seesCb, [encryptCkbs,goodkeyCkab,a,b)),encryptCkab,combinedCnb, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b) , 
believesCs,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)))]))]) {1, Seeing} 
3. believesCb,goodkeyCkbs,b,s)) {Assumption} 
4 . sees Cb, encrypt Ckbs, goodkeyCkab, a, b))) {2, Sight} 
5. believesCb,goodkeyCkbs,s,b)) {3, Bidirectionality} 
6. sees Cb, encrypt Ckab, combinedCnb, [nb,goodkeyCkab, a,b),believesCs,f reshCgoodkeyCkab, a,b)))]))) 
{2, Sight} 
7 . believesCb,oncesaidCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. sees Cb, combined Cnb, [nb, goodkeyCkab, a, b), believes Cs, fresh Cgoodkey Ckab, a, b))) ] )) 
{7, 6 , Message decryption} 
9. believesCb,secretCnb,a,b)) {Assumption} 
10. believesCb,freshCnb)) {Assumption} 
11. believesCb,oncesaidCa,[nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b),believesCs,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)))])) 
{9, 8 , Message meaning} 
12. believesCb,freshC[nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b),believesCs,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)))])) {10, Freshness} 
13. believesCb,believesCa, [nb,goodkeyCkab,a,b) ,believesCs,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)))])) 
{12, 1}., lonce verification} 
14. believesCb,believesCa,believesCs,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b))))) {13, Belief} 
15. believesCb,jurisdictionCa,believesCs,freshCgoodkeyC.1263340,a,b))))) {Assumption} 
16. believesCb,believesCs,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b)))) {15, 14, Jurisdiction} 
17. believesCb,jurisdictionCs,freshCgoodkeyC.1263476,a,b)))) {Assumption} 
18. believesCb,freshCgoodkeyCkab,a,b))) {17, 16, Jurisdiction} 
19. believesCb,believesCs,goodkeyCkab,a,b))) {18, 7 , lonce verification} 
20. believesCb,jurisdictionCs,goodkeyC_1263660,a,b))) {Assumption} 
21. believesCb,goodkeyCkab,a,b)) {20, 19, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCb, believesCa, goodkeyCkab, a, b)))) 
1 . s e n d s ( a , b , [ e n c r y p t ( k b s , g o o < l k e y ( k a b , a , b ) ) , e n c r y p t ( k a b , c o m b i n e d ( n b , [ n b , g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) , 
b e l i e v e s ( s , f r e s h ( g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) ] ) { S t e p } 
2 . s e e s ( b , [ e n c r y p t ( k b s , g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) ) , e n c r y p t ( k a b , c o m b i n e d C n b , [ n b , g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) , 
b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h ( g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) ] ) { 1 , S e e i n g } 
3 . b e l i e v e s ( b , g o o d k e y ( k b s , b , s ) ) { A s s u m p t i o n } 
4 . s e e i s ( b , e n c r y p t ( k b s , g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) ) ) { 2 , S i g h t } 
5 . b e l i e v e s ( b , g o o d k e y ( k b s , s , b ) ) { 3 , B i d i r e c t i o n a l i t y } 
6 . s e e s ( b , e n c r y p t ( k a b , c o m b i n e d ( n b , [ n b , g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h ( g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) ) 
{ 2 , S i g h t } 
7 . b e l i e v e s ( b , o n c e s a i d ( s , g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) ) ) { 5 , 4 , M e s s a g e m e a n i n g } 
8 . s e e s ( b , c o m b i n e d ( n b , [ n b , g o o d k e y ( k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) 
{ 7 , 6 , M e s s a g e d e c r y p t i o n } 
9 . b e l i e v e s C b , s e c r e t C n b , a , b ) ) { A s s u m p t i o n } 
1 0 . b e l i e v e s C b . f r e s h C n b ) ) { A s s u m p t i o n } 
1 1 . b e l i e v e s C b , o n c e s a i d C a , [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) 
{ 9 , 8 , M e s s a g e m e a n i n g } 
1 2 . b e l i e v e s C b , f r e s h C [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) { 1 0 , F r e s h n e s s } 
1 3 . b e l i e v e s C b , b e l i e v e s C a , [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) 
{ 1 2 , 1 1 , l o n c e v e r i f i c a t i o n } 
1 4 . b e l i e v e s C b , b e l i e v e s C a , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) { 1 3 , B e l i e f } 
1 . s e n d s C a , b , [ e n c r y p t C k b s , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) , e n c r y p t C k a b , c o m b i n e d C n b , [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , 
b e l i e v e s ( s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) ] ) { S t e p } 
2 . s e e s C b , [ e n c r y p t C k b s , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) , e n c r y p t C k a b , c o m b i n e d C n b , [ n b . g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , 
b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) ] ) { 1 , S e e i n g } 
3 . b e l i e v e s C b , g o o d k e y C k b s , b , s ) ) { A s s u m p t i o n } 
4 . s e e s C b , e n c r y p t C k b s , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) { 2 , S i g h t } 
5 . b e l i e v e s C b , g o o d k e y C k b s , s , b ) ) { 3 , B i d i r e c t i o n a l i t y } 
6 . s e e s C b , e n c r y p t C k a b , c o m b i n e d C n b , [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) ) 
{ 2 , S i g h t } 
7 . b e l i e v e s C b , o n c e s a i d C s , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) { 5 , 4 , M e s s a g e m e a n i n g } 
8 . s e e s C b , c o m b i n e d C n b , [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) 
{ 7 , 6 , M e s s a g e d e c r y p t i o n } 
9 . b e l i e v e s C b , 8 e c r e t C n b , a , b ) ) { A s s u m p t i o n } 
1 0 . b e l i e v e s C b , o n c e s a i d C a , [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) 
{ 9 , 8 , M e s s a g e m e a n i n g } 
1 1 . b e l i e v e s C b , f r e s h C n b ) ) { A s s u m p t i o n } 
1 2 . b e l i e v e s C b , f r e s h C [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) { 1 1 , F r e s h n e s s } 
1 3 . b e l i e v e s C b . b e l i e v e s C a , [ n b , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ] ) ) 
{ 1 2 , 1 0 , l o n c e v e r i f i c a t i o n } 
1 4 . b e l i e v e s C b , b e l i e v e s C a , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ) ) { 1 3 , B e l i e f } 
1 5 . b e l i e v e s C b , j u r i s d i c t i o n C a , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C _ 1 2 6 4 3 1 2 , a , b ) ) ) ) ) { A s s u m p t i o n } 
1 6 . b e l i e v e s C b , b e l i e v e s C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) ) { I S , 1 4 , J u r i s d i c t i o n } 
1 7 . b e l i e v e s C b , j u r i s d i c t i o n C s , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C _ 1 2 6 4 4 4 8 , a , b ) ) ) ) { A s s u m p t i o n } 
1 8 . b e l i e v e s C b , o n c e s a i d C a , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) { 1 0 , U t t e r a n c e } 
1 9 . b e l i e v e s C b , f r e s h C g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) { 1 7 , 1 6 , J u r i s d i c t i o n } 
2 0 . b e l i e v e s C b , b e l i e v e s C a , g o o d k e y C k a b , a , b ) ) ) { 1 9 , 1 8 , l o n c e v e r i f i c a t i o n } 
y e s 
I ?- [user]. 
[Compiling user] 
goal(believes(a, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(a, believesCb, na))). 
goal(believes(b, goodkey(kab, a, b))). 
goal(believes(b, believesCa, goodkey(kab, a, b)))) 
[user compiled, cpu time used: 0.91 seconds] 
[user loaded] 
yes 
I ?- chk.redCa, A, As), 
no 
I ?- chk_red(b, A, As). 
B.5 The Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Pro-
tocol 
Message 1 A —> 5 : A,B 
Message 2 5' —> A : 
Message 3 A-^ B : 
Message 4 B ^ S: B,A 
Message 5 5 - ^ B: 
Message 6 B A: 
Message 7 A^ B : {NbU 
B,5 , l Program Representation 
7, The leedham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol 
% Idealized Protocol 
factd, sendsCs, a, encrypt(inv(ks), public(kb, b))), reason([], 'Step>)). 
fact(2, sendsCa, b, encrypt(kb, na)), reason([], »Step')). 
facto, sends (s, b, encrypt (inv(ks), public (ka, a))), reason([], 'Step')). 
%v/xmvm%m%m:/xav/xm%m^ 
y. Idealized Message 6 différés from the one given in [1] 
fact(4^ sends(b, a, encrypt(ka, combined(na, [na, secret(nb, a, b)]))), reason([], 'Step')) 
t Idealized Message 7 differs from the one given in [1] 
fact(5, sends(a,b,encrypt(kb,combined(nb,[nb, secret(na,a,b),believes(b,secret(nb,a,b))]))), 
reason([], 'Step')). 
% Assumptions 
fact(6, believes(a, public(ka, a)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(7, believesCa, public(ks, s)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(8, believesCa, jurisdictionCs, public(_, b))), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
f a c t O , believesCa, fresh(na)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
factCiO, believes(a, secretCna, a, b)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
factCli, believesCa, freshCpublicCkb, b))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCi2, believesCb, publicCkb, b)), reasonC[], 'Assumption')). 
facte13, believesCb, publicCks, s)), reasonC[], 'Assumption')). 
factCl4, believesCb, jurisdictionCs, publicC., a))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factClS, believesCb, freshCnb)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factCl6, believesCb, secretCnb, a, b)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factClT, believesCb, freshCpublicCka, a))), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factClS, believesCs, publicCka, a)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factClS, believesCs, publicCkb, b)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
factC20, believesCs, publicCks, s)), reasonCC], 'Assumption')). 
B.5.2 Proofs 
I ?- analyzeCnspk). 
Analyzed in 4 cycles 
yes 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCa, publicCkb, b))). 
1. sendsCs,a,encryptCinvCks).publicCkb,b))) {Step} 
2. seesCa,encryptCinvCks),publicCkb,b))) {1, Seeing} 
3. believesCa,publicCks,s)) {Assumption} 
4. believesCa,oncesaidCs,publicCkb,b))) {3, 2, Message meaning} 
5. believesCa,freshCpublicCkb,b))) {Assumption} 
6. believesCa,believesCs,publicCkb,b))) {5, 4, lonce verification} 
7. believesCa,jurisdictionCs,publicC_1258528,b))) {Assumption} 
8. believesCa,publicCkb,b)) {7, 6, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
Nh 
The need to idealize Message 6 as {(iVa, A ^ is highlighted by the 
following proof: 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCa, believesCb, secretCnb, a, b)))). 
1. sendsCb,a,encrypt Cka,combinedCna, Cna,secret Cnb,a,b)]))) {Step} 
2. seesCa,encryptCka,combinedCna,Cna,secretCnb,a,b)]))) {1, Seeing} 
3. believesCa,publicCka,a)) {Assumption} 
4. believesCa,secretCna,a,b)) {Assumption} 
5. seesCa,combinedCna,Cna,secretCnb,a,b)])) {3, 2, Message decryption} 
6. believes(a,secret(na,b,a)) {4, Bidirectionality} 
7. believes(a,fresh(na)> {Assumption} 
8. believes(a,oncesaid(b, [na,secret(nb,a,b)])) {6, 5, Message meaning} 
9. believes(a,fresh([na,secret(nb,a,b)])) {7, Freshness} 
10. believes(a,believes(b,[na,secret(nb,a,b)])) {9, 8, lonce verification} 
11. believes(a,believes(b,secret(nb,a,b))) {10, Belief} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(b, publicCka, a))). 
1. sends(s,b,encrypt(inv(ks),public(ka,a))) {Step} 
2. sees(b,encrypt(inv(ks),public(ka,a))) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(b,public(ks,s)) {Assumption} 
4. believes(b,oncesaid(s,publicCka,a))) {3, 2, Message meaning} 
5. believes(b,fresh(public(ka,a))) {Assumption} 
6. believes(b,believes(s,publicCka,a))) {5, 4, lonce verification} 
7. believesCb,jurisdictionCs,publicC_1258528,a))) {Assumption} 
8. believesCb,publicCka,a)) {7, 6, Jurisdiction} 
yes 
The need to idealize Message 7 as B , B ^ A ^ is high-
lighted by the following proof: 
I ?- explain.proofCbelievesCb, believesCa, secretCna, a, b)))). 
1. sendsCa,b,encryptCkb,combinedCnb,[nb,secretCna,a,b),believesCb,secretCnb,a,b))]))) {Step} 
2. seesCb,encryptCkb,combinedCnb,[nb,secretCna,a,b),believesCb,secretCnb,a,b))]))) {1, Seeing} 
3. believesCb,publicCkb.b)) {Assumption} 
4. seesCb,combinedCnb,[nb,secretCna,a,b) ,believesCb,secretCnb,a,b))])) {3, 2, Message decryption} 
5. believesCb,secretCnb,a,b)) {Assumption} 
6. believesCb,freshCnb)) {Assumption} 
7. believesCb,oncesaidCa,[nb,secretCna,a,b) .believesCb,secretCnb,a,b))])) {5, 4, Message meaning} 
8. believesCb,freshCCnb,secretCna,a,b),believesCb,secretCnb,a,b))])) {6, Freshness} 
9. b e l i e v e s C b , b e l i e v e s C a , [nb,secretCna,a,b),believesCb,secretCnb,a,b))])) {8, 7, lonce verification} 
10. believesCb,believesCa,secretCna,a,b))) {9, Belief} 
yes 
I ?- [user]. 
[Compiling user] 
goalCbelievesCa, publicCkb, b))). 
goalCbelievesCa, believesCb, secretCnb, a, b)))) 
goalCbelievesCb, publicCka, a))), 
goalCbelievesCb, believesCa, secretCna, a, b)))) 
[user compiled, cpu time used: 0.28003 seconds] 
[user loaded] 
yes 
I ?- chk_red(a, A, As) 
no 
I ?- chk_red(b. A, As) 
B.6 The CCITT.X509 Protocol 
Message 1 A ^ B 
Message 2 B ^ A 
Message 3 A ^ B 
B.6.1 Program Representation 
'/, The CCITT X.500 Protocol 
% Idealized Protocol 
f a c t d , sends(a, b, encrypt (inv(ka), [ta, na, xa, encryptCkb, ya)])), reason([], 'Step')). 
fact(2, sendsCb, a, encrypt(inv(kb), [tb, nb, na, xb, encrypt(ka, yb)])), reason([], 'Step')) 
fact(3, sendsCa, b, encrypt(inv(ka), nb)), reason([], 'Step')). 
% Assumptions 
fact(4, believesCa, public(ka, a)), reason([], 'Assumption')), 
fact(5, believes(a, public(kb, b)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(6, believes(a, fresh(na)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(7, believes(a, fresh(tb)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
fact(8, believesCb, publicCkb, b)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
f a c t O , believesCb, public(ka, a)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
factClO, believesCb, fresh(nb)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
factCll, believesCb, fresh(ta)), reason([], 'Assumption')). 
B.6.2 Proofs 
I ?- analyze(ccitt). 
Analyzed in 3 cycles 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believesCa, believesCb, xb))). 
1. sendsCb,a,encryptCinvCkb),[tb,nb,na,xb,encryptCka,yb)])) {Step} 
2. seesCa,encryptCinvCkb),[tb,nb,na,xb,encryptCka,yb)])) {1, Seeing} 
3. believesCa,publicCkb,b)) {Assumption} 
4. believesCa,freshCna)) {Assumption} 
5. believesCa,oncesaidCb,[tb,nb,na,xb,encryptCka,yb)])) {3, 2, Message meaning} 
6. believesCa,freshC[tb,nb,na,xb,encryptCka,yb)])) {4, Freshness} 
7. believes(a,believes(b, [tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)])) {6, 5, lonce verification} 
8. believes(a,believes(b,xb)) {7, Belief} 
1. sends(b,a,encrypt(inv(kb) , [tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)] )) {Step} 
2. sees(a,encrypt(inv(kb) , [tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)])) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(a,public(kb,b)) {Assumption} 
4. believes(a,fresh(tb)) {Assumption} 
5. believes(a,oncesaid(b,[tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)])) {3, 2, Message meaning} 
6. believes(a,fresh([tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)])) {4, Freshness} 
7. believes(a,believes(b, [tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)])) {6, 5, lonce verification} 
8. believes(a,believes(b,xb)) {7, Belief} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(sees(a, yb)). 
1. sends(b,a,encrypt(inv(kb) , [tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)] )) {Step} 
2. sees(a,encrypt(inv(kb) , [tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)])) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(a,public(kb,b)) {Assumption} 
4. sees(a,[tb,nb,na,xb,encrypt(ka,yb)]) {3, 2, Message decryption} 
5. sees(a,encrypt(ka,yb)) {4, Sight} 
6. belj.eves(a,public(ka,a)) {Assumption} 
7. sees(a,yb) {6, 5, Message decryption} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(believes(b, believes(a, nb))). 
1. sends(a,b,encrypt(inv(ka),nb)) {Step} 
2. sees(b,encrypt(inv(ka),nb)) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(b,public(ka,a)) {Assumption} 
4. believes(b.oncesaid(a,nb)) {3, 2, Message meaning} 
5. believes(b,fresh(nb)) {Assumption} 
6. believes(b,believes(a,nb)) {5, 4, lonce verification} 
yes 
I ?- explain.proof(sees(b, ya)). 
1. sends(a,b,encrypt(inv<ka) ,[ta,na,xa,encrypt(kb,ya)])) {Step} 
2. sees(b,encrypt(inv(ka) ,[ta,na,xa,encrypt(kb,ya)])) {1, Seeing} 
3. believes(b,public(ka,a)) {Assumption} 
4. sees(b,[ta,na,xa,encrypt(kb.ya)]) {3, 2, Message decryption} 
5. sees(b,encrypt(kb.ya)) {4, Sight} 
6. believes(b,public(kb,b)) {Assumption} 
7. sees(b,ya) {6, 5, Message decryption} 
yes 
I ?- [user]. 
[Compiling user] 
goal(believes(a, believes(b, xb))). 
goal(sees(a, yb)). 
goal(sees(b, ya)). 
goal(believes(b, believesCa, nb))). 
goaKbelievesCb, believesCa, xa))). 
[user compiled, cpu time used: 0.831 seconds] 
[user loaded] 
yes 
I ?- chk.redCa, A, As). 
A = believes(a,fresh(na)) 
As = [believesCa,publicCka,a)) ,believesCa,publicCkb,b)),believesCa,freshCtb))] 
A = believesCa,freshCtb)) 
As = [believesCa,publicCka,a)),believesCa,publicCkb.b)),believesCa,freshCna))] 
no 
I ?- chk.redCb, A, As). 
Appendix C 
B A N Logic Analyzer Program 
y. File : ban.P 
y. 
y. Author : Anish Mathuria 
y. 
y. Description : This module contains predicates for the BAN Logic 
y. protocol analyzer program written in XSB Prolog. 
:- import member/2, append/3, reverse/2, ith/3, select/3 from basics. 
% analyze(Protocol) 
Top-level predicate. It's argument is the full path name of the file 




findalKlndex, fact(Index, _, _), Indices), 
maxdndices, Naxindex), 
asserta(flag(count, Maxindex)), 





iactd, sends(_, Q, X), _), 
flagCcount, Currlndex), 
Newlndex is Currlndex + 1, 




•/, forward (Cycle) - Main Driver 
*/, Repeatedly cycles through the rules defined for r/0. It 
*/• succeeds when no new statements can be derived. The 
*/, argument Cycle is incremented with every rule cycle 
% performed. 
forward(Cycle) :-
Cycle > 0, 
done, 
write('Analyzed in '), write(Cycle), writeC cycles'), nl. 
forward(Cycle) :-
apply_rules, 
NextCycle is Cycle + 1 , 
forward(NextCycle). 
y. done/0 checks the status of the global flag new.fact. It succeeds when 
'/. new_fact is no. This corresponds to the case when no fact is added in 
*/, the' rule cycle. Otherwise when new_fact is yes it fails and resets 







y, apply.rules - Applies all inference rules 
y. Applies inference rules to the facts in the database 
























•/, Inference rules 
•/. Message-meaning rules 
•/, For shared keys 
message_meaning(believes(P, oncesaid(Q, X)), 
reason([11,12], 'Message meaning')) 
. factdi, believes(P, goodkey(K, Q, P)), _), 
fact(I2, sees(P, encrypt(K, X)), _). 
y. For Public keys 
message_meaning(believes(P, oncesaid(Q, X)), 
reason([11,12], 'Message meaning')) 
factdi, believes(P, public(K, Q)), _), 
fact(12, sees(P, encrypt(inv(K), X)), _). 
•/, For shared secrets 
message_meaning(believes(P, oncesaid(Q, X)), 
r e a s o n C [ 1 1 , 1 2 ] , 'Message m e a n i n g ' ) ) 
i a c t d l , b e l i e v e s ( P , s e c r e t ( Y , Q , P ) ) , _ ) , 
f a c t ( 1 2 , s e e s ( P , combined(Y, X ) ) , _ ) . 
y. N o h c e - v e r i f i c a t i o n r u l e 
n o n c e _ v e r i i i c a t i o n ( b e l i e v e s ( P , b e l i e v e s ( Q , X ) ) , 
r e a s o n ( [ 1 1 , 1 2 ] , ' N o n c e v e r i f i c a t i o n ' ) ) : -
f a c t d l , b e l i e v e s ( P , f r e s h ( X ) ) , _ ) , 
f a c t ( 1 2 , b e l i e v e s ( P , o n c e s a i d ( Q , X ) ) , _ ) . 
'/. J u r i s d i c t i o n r u l e 
j u r i s d i c t i o n ( b e l i e v e s ( P , X ) , r e a s o n ( [ I l , 1 2 ] , ' J u r i s d i c t i o n ' ) ) 
f a c t d l , b e l i e v e s ( P , j u r i s d i c t i o n ( Q , X ) ) , _ ) , 
f a c t ( I 2 , b e l i e v e s ( P , b e l i e v e s ( Q , X ) ) , _ ) . 
*/• B e l i e f r u l e s 
b e l i e f ( b e l i e v e s ( P , M ) , r e a s o n ( [ I ] , ' B e l i e f ' ) ) : -
f a c t d , b e l i e v e s ( P , L ) , _ ) , 
member(M, L ) . 
b e l i e f ( b e l i e v e s ( P , b e l i e v e s ( q , M ) ) , r e a s o n ( [ I ] , ' B e l i e f ' ) ) : -
f a c t d , b e l i e v e s ( P , b e l i e v e s ( Q , L ) ) , _ ) , 
member(M, L ) . 
y. U t t e r a n c e r u l e 
u t t e r a n c e ( b e l i e v e s ( P , o n c e s a i d ( Q , M ) ) , r e a s o n ( [ I ] , ' U t t e r a n c e ' ) ) : -
f a c t d , b e l i e v e s ( P , o n c e s a i d ( Q , L ) ) , _ ) , 
member(M, L ) . 
y. S i g h t r u l e s 
s i g h t ( s e e s ( P , M ) , r e a s o n ( [ I ] , ' S i g h t ' ) ) : -
f a c t d , s e e s ( P , L ) , _ ) , 
member(M, L ) . 
s i g h t ( s e e s ( P , X ) , r e a s o n ( [ I ] , ' S i g h t ' ) ) : -
• f a c t d , s e e s ( P , combined(_, X ) ) , _ ) . 
y. Message d e c r y p t i o n r u l e s 
y. F o r shared keys 
message_decryption(sees(P, X ) , r e a s o n ( [ I l , 1 2 ] , 'Message d e c r y p t i o n ' ) ) 
f a c t d l , b e l i e v e s ( P , goodkey(K, _, P ) ) , _ ) , 
f a c t ( I 2 , s e e s ( P , e n c r y p t ( K , X ) ) , _ ) . 
y. For public keys 
messaige_decryption(sees(P, X), reason([Il, 12], 'Message decryption')) 
iactCll, believes(P, public(K, ?)), _), 
fact(12, sees(P, encrypt(K, X)), _). 
message_decryption(sees(P, X), reason([Il, 12], 'Message decryption')) 
fact(II, believes(P, public(K, _)), _), 
fact(12, sees(P, encrypt(inv(K), X)), _). 
*/• Uncertified keys 
message_decryption(sees(P, X), reason(Cll, 12], 'Message decryption')) 
factdl, believes(P, oncesaid(_, goodkey(K, _, P))), _), 
fact(12, sees(P, encrypt(K, X)), _). 
*/. Freshness rule 
freshness(believes(P, fresh(X)), reason([I], 'Freshness')):-
factd, believes(P, fresh(M)), _), 
fact(_, believes(P, oncesaid(_, X)), _), 
member(M, X). 
y, Bidirectionality rules 
y. For shared keys 
bidirectionality(believes(P, goodkey(K, R, Q)), 
reason(Cl], 'Bidirectionality')) 
fact(I, believes(P, goodkey(K, Q, R)), _). 
bidirectionality(believes(P, believes(Q, goodkey(K, R, S))), 
reason([I], 'Bidirectionality')) :-
fact(I, believes(P, believes(Q, goodkey(K, S, R))), _). 
y. For shared secrets 
bidirectionality(believes(P, secret(X, R, Q)), 
reason([I], 'Bidirectionality')) :-
factd, believes(P, secret(X, Q, R)), _). 
bidirectionality(believes(P, believes(Q, secret(X, S, R))), 
reason(Cl], 'Bidirectionality')) :-
factd, believes(P, believes(Q, secret(X, R, S))), _). 
y. Maintains derived facts 
addfact(Formula, reason(PremIs, Rule)) 
check(Formula, reason(PremIs, Rule)), 
flagCcoiint, Currlndex), 
Newlndex is Currlndex + 1, 
assertz(iact(NewIndex, Formula, reason(PremIs, Rule))), 
set.flag(count, Newlndex), 
set_flag(new_fact, yes). 
y. set_f lag (Name, Val) - Maintains globals 








y, check (Formula, Reason) - Loop checker 
y. Succeeds if insertion of the fact representing the derivation 
y, of the statement Formula whose derivation information is in 
y. Reason would lead to an infinite loop; fails otherwise. 
y. Inference already made 
check(Formula, Reason) 
fact(_, Formula, Reason), 
fail. 
y. Check if the inferred statement Formula was used earlier in 
y, deriving a premise in Premis 
check(Formula, reason(PremIs, _)) 
findalldndex, fact(Index, Formula, _), Indices), 
Indices \= [] , 
' > 
checkall(Premis, Indices). 
% New derivation 
check(_, _). 
checkalKC], _) . 
checkall ( [Premlndex I Premlndices] , Indices ) : -
proof(Premlndex, ProofOfPrem), 
intersectionClndices, [Premlndex I Proof Of Prem] , [] ), 
checkall(Premlndices, Indices). 
y, explain.pr oof (Goal) - Proof Explanation 







% build.proof(Goal, Proof) - Builds index list of proofs 
*/, The list Proof represents a minimal proof of statement Goal, 
build.proof(Goal, Proof) :-
fact(Index, Goal, _), 
proof(Index, ProofDup), 
remdup([Index I ProofDup], RevProof), 
reverse(RevProof, Proof). 
•/, proof (Index, Proof Dup) - Traverses database 
•/, Traverses the database to build the list ProofDup containing 
y, the indices of the facts used in a derivation of fact with 
y, index Index. 
proof(Index, ProofDup) 
factdndex, _, reason(Premises, _)), 
append(Premises, ProofOfPremises, ProofDup), 
prooflist(Premises, ProofOfPremises). 
prooflist([] , []). 
prooflist([Premise I Premises] , TotalProof) :-
proof(Premise, ProofOfPremise), 
prooflist(Premises, ProofOfPremises), 
append(ProofOfPremise, ProofOfPremises, TotalProof). 
y, write_proof(Proof) - Prints proof 
y. Prints a formatted proof from the list Proof 
write.proof(Proof) 
write_proof(Proof, Proof), 
write.proof ( [] , _). 
write_proof([Index I Indices], Proof) :-
factdndex, Formula, reason(Premises, Rule)), 
ith(StepNo, Proof, Index), 
write(StepKo), write('.'), 
w r i t e C '), write(Formula), tab(2), 
write('-C')» write.list(Premises, Proof), write(Rule), 
writeC}'), nl, 
write_proof(Indices, Proof). 
y, write_list(Indices, Proof) - Prints justification of a step 
*/, Prints step numbers of the premises in the list Indices 
y, using the list Proof as a reference. 
write_list([], _). 
write_list([IndexI Indices], Proofis) :-
ith(St epNo, ProofIs, Index), 
write (St epNo), writeC, '), 
write_list(Indices, Proofis), 
y. chk_red(P, RedAssumption, MinAssumptions) 
y. Identifies redundant assumptions 
y. The list MinAssumptions is the minimal set of assumptions 
y, excluding a redundant assumption RedAssumption of principal P 
chk_red(P, RedAssumption, MinAssumptions) :-
findalKAssumption, is_ass(P, Assumption, _), Assumptions), 
is_ass(P, RedAssumption, Index), 
findalKGoal, (goal(Goal), arg(l. Goal, P)), Goals), 
Goals \= [] , 
chk_allfmla(Index, Goals), 
select(RedAssumption, Assumptions, MinAssumptions). 
y. is_ass(P, Assumption, Index) - Gets assumptions 
y. Index is the index of the database fact representing 
y, the assumption Assumption of principal P. 
is_ass(P, Assumption, Index) :-
factdndex. Assumption, reason([], 'Assumption')), 
a r g d . Assumption, P). 
y. chk_allfmla(Index, Formulae) - Checks proofs of all formulae 
chk_allfmla(_, []). 
chk_allfmla(Index, [FormulaI Formulae]) : -
chk_fmla(Index, Formula), 
chk_allfmla(Index, Formulae). 
*/. chk_fmla(Index, Formula) - Checks all proofs of a formula 
chk_fmla(Index, Formula) 
findall(Proof, build_proof(Formula, Proof), Proofs), 
chk_proof(Index, Proof s). 
chk_proof(Index, [Proof I_]) : -
not(member(Index, Proof)), 
! . 
chk_proof(Index, [_I Proofs]) :-
chk_proof(Index, Proofs). 
% Miscellaoieous list processing predicates 
% max(List, Max) - Finds list maximmn 




Head >= MaxTail, 
I 
• » 
Max = Head. 
max([_|Tail], Max) 
maxdail. Max). 
y, remove_dups (DupList, UniqList) - Removes duplicates 
y, Each element of the list DupList occurs 
y. in the list UniqList only once. 
remove_dups ( [] , [] ). 





remove.dups ( [Head I Tail] , [Head I UniqTail] ) : -
remove.dups(Tail, UniqTail). 
y, intersection(Listl, List2, List3) - Set intersection 
y. The list Lists is the intersection of the 
y« lists Listl and List2. 
intersectionC[] , []). 




Lists = [HeadlI Tails], 
intersection(Taill, List2, TailS). 
intersectionC[_ITaill], List2, Lists) :-
intersection(Taill, List2, ListS). 

